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Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Professor of Law and Director of the Indigenous
Law & Policy Center, Michigan State University College of Law
Miigwetch, Mary Louise for the kind introduction and kind words. I am
going to spend a couple of minutes talking about why we are here and
introducing this whole thing. We are going to talk about Phil Frickey’s
call, so I guess we have to thank him also for being here. This really started
five or six years ago. Frickey spoke about something he called new realism
back in 2006 at the Cohen Symposium.1 Then, in 2007, he brought a bunch
of us — including some that are here and others — to talk about what that
might mean for legal scholars.2 He spoke a little bit more about it in 2008 in
his Kansas address right near the end of his life.3
I would say looking back at those materials and thinking about what I
recalled about what was going on, I think there were four things that Phil
was calling for. The first is more empirical research, social science research
that has good methodology and actual analysis based on actual data from
Indian Country. He was also saying, “Let’s have more research that is
grounded in tribal realities in Indian Country, more theoretical and practical
research.” He also added that Indian scholars need to have more scholarly
objectivity. Finally, he said there should be fewer doctrinal papers. I think
what Phil said was, “We do not need to write the twenty-seventh article
about Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe4 all the time; it’s already been

1. See Philip P. Frickey, Transcending Transcendental Nonsense: Toward a New
Realism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 649 (2006) [hereinafter Frickey,
Transcending] (essay based on an address given at the symposium “Indian Law at a
Crossroads,” University of Connecticut School of Law, Oct. 28, 2005).
2. See Conference Transcript: The New Realism: The Next Generation of Scholarship
in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2007-2008) [hereinafter Conference
Transcript] (transcript of a meeting of the National Congress of American Indians, Berkeley,
Cal., Nov. 17, 2006).
3. See Philip P. Frickey, Address at University of Kansas Conference on Tribal Law
and Institutions, February 2, 2008: Tribal Law, Tribal Context, and the Federal Courts, 18
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 24 (2008) [hereinafter Frickey, Address].
4. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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done.” To be fair, what’s missing from Indian law is the Indians.5 Frank
Pommersheim in his book Braid of Feathers from the mid-1990s said there
is just not enough tribally centered scholarship out there.6 Of course, we all
know Sam Deloria says this all the time.7 I bring Sam up because he, of
everyone, is really interested in the scholarly activity of this new realism,
this research, and he would say we need less cheerleading. This is our fiveyear retrospective.
I wanted to highlight something that I wrote about in a short paper — it
is an honor to talk about it at this conference — on the citation patterns of
federal, state, and tribal courts to Indian law scholarship going back to
1959.8 But I want to talk a little bit, before we move on to this panel, about
my own experiences, about what brought us out here in 2007, and I took
very seriously what he was saying. I can tell you realism is not easy. I have
had so many starts and stops and foibles since then that it’s not funny. One
of the things I remember John Dossett talking about specifically back in
2007 was, “When will we know what the rules are for fee to trust
acquisitions? We do not know what kind of lands go into trust.”9 We don’t
know case-by-case what’s going to happen, and a good study would be a
survey of how that actually works. I take that prescription seriously.
I come from the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians
in Michigan. We were federally recognized in 1980 with twelve acres, and
we have been trying to get land back ever since.10 So the trust acquisition
process is central to our core as a modern government, and I know about it
myself, but I tell you, unless I had a couple million bucks to research this
thing, it’s not going to happen. If you want information regarding so-andso, the Department of the Interior (“Interior”) would be happy to give it to
you eventually, but for a cost.
5. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the
Content and Character of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 203 (1989).
6. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE (1995).
7. E.g., Sam Deloria, Commentary on Nation-Building: The Future of Indian Nations,
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 55 (2002) (based on remarks during a panel discussion at the “Symposium
on Cultural Sovereignty: Native Rights in the 21st Century,” March 7, 2001).
8. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, American Indian Legal Scholarship and the Courts:
Heeding Frickey’s Call, CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT (Mar. 21, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.
californialawreview.org/articles/american-indian-legal-scholarship-and-the-courts-heedingfrickey-s-call.
9. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006).
10. See MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE EAGLE RETURNS: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS (2012).
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For example, I had my law library request some documents from the
Interior under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), only twenty-five
cents a page, which is probably something we could have negotiated, but
there were 12,000 pages. I just couldn’t do it; I had to get tenure first. There
are other things too, in regards to getting research done. I remember Pat
Sekaquaptewa saying this as well at the conference in 2007.11 It’s not easy
to go to Indian Country and say, “Hey, give us this information,” right? She
was saying that it’s hard for tribal leaders, tribal attorneys, Indian people, or
scholars to come on the reservation and demand all this information, no
matter how nicely they do it.We still remember the anthropologist problem
that Vine Deloria talked about in the 1960s.12
So there is also a demand on time. For example, another research project
I started had to do with how many nonmembers in Indian Country have
consented to tribal jurisdiction. I just wanted to do a sampling of a couple
of different tribes just to get a sense. I know from some other tribes I
worked for in the West that there were a lot of people who worked for the
tribe, such as non-Indians who were employees for the tribe, had vendor
contracts with the tribe, and who lived in tribal housing with tribal members
who may have been their family members. It would have been nice to get a
guestimate; but it’s almost impossible to get that information.
The Navajo Tribe is great — they will send you to every single agency
that doesn’t have that information. There are a lot of those agencies. But I
was able to write a few papers about that even before Phil passed away. I
was able to get a copy of some of the materials Justice Blackmun had made
available online13 (thanks to John Dossett and Ian Gershengorn who told me
about this) from the mid-1980s to late 1990s about what the Supreme Court
justices are thinking, and what they write (during the certiorari process).14 I
started shortly after the conference; I wasn’t thinking about the conference
anymore. It ends up being related in some way, the core of the research I
did, ironically. So this conference is in honor of all that.
I am not going to introduce the panelists one by one. We don’t have a
whole lot of time. They have ten to twelve minutes to talk. I’m here with a
stick to make sure we don’t go over our time. Thank you.
11. See generally Conference Transcript, supra note 2, at 120-26.
12. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN
MANIFESTO 78-100 (Univ. of Okla. Press 1988) (1969).
13. Digital Archive of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun, UNIV. OF S. CAL – LEE EPSTEIN,
http://epstein.usc.edu/blackmun.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
14. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as
Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2009).
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Joseph Heath, Attorney at Law, Onondaga Nation General Counsel15
Good afternoon everyone. I want to thank the law school for having this
forum and all of you for coming.
My name is Joe Heath. I am fortunate enough to be General Counsel for
the Onondaga Nation. Onondaga is the central fire of the Haudenosaunee
Confederacy. They are often known as the Iroquois, which is a pejorative
French colonial term. Their name for themselves is Haudenosaunee, which
roughly translates as “People of the Longhouse.”
Onondaga is a traditional nation.16 They still govern themselves by the
Great Law of Peace that was brought to them over a thousand years ago by
the Peacemaker. They are governed by a Council of Chiefs, selected by
Clan Mothers, who also have the removal authority.17 They have
maintained their active clan system, and they still perform their ceremonies
and speak their language.18 The Tadodaho was hopeful to be here today,
but they are in the middle of a ceremonial period that runs for about five
weeks, and he just could not get away from that.
The Onondaga Nation does not accept any federal funding.19 Most of the
work my office does — there are only two lawyers and a community
organizer — is diplomatic and environmental because the nation is trying to
fulfill its obligation to be good stewards of the land and water that is left in
central New York. I will get back to some of our environmental work in a
minute.

15. General Counsel to the Onondaga Nation, the central fire keeper of the
Haudenosaunee Confederacy. Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, Syracuse University
Law School, 1982; Adjunct Professor, SUNY Oswego, 1982-1983; A.B., Syracuse
University, 1968; J.D., SUNY Buffalo, 1974; and admitted to the New York State Bar in
1975.
This Essay was originally presented as a speech on September 27, 2012 at the UC
Berkeley Law School at the “Heeding Frickey’s Call: Doing Justice in Indian Country”
Symposium. I take full responsibility for all unsupported assertions in this Essay, as they are
based upon my personal observations during my three decades of working for the Onondaga
Nation.
The author wishes to acknowledge and express appreciation for the research assistance
provided for this Essay by Jenna Gansworth, J. D. Syracuse University Law School, 2012.
16. Joseph Heath, Review of the History of the April 1997 Trade and Commerce
Agreement Among the Traditional Haudenosaunee Councils of Chiefs and New York State
and the Impact Thereof on Haudenosaunee Sovereignty, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 1011, 1012 n.2
(1998).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1022 n.33.
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Of the issues that face the Onondaga right now, the worst one, the one
that is weighing on them the heaviest, is the federal district court dismissal
of their land rights action. This action was but the latest in a series of
Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions leading to the dismissal of the
Six Nations’ land claims. The Second Circuit dismissed the Cayuga
Nation’s land claim in June of 2005.20 This was only three months after the
Sherrill decision,21 in which the Supreme Court made up a new equitable
defense, the “new laches.” We have people around the country who are
beginning to write about the laches defense and break it down.22 We
searched for years to figure out what happened to equity here, what
happened to fairness. Then the Second Circuit sort of educated us about that
in the summer of 2010, when they dismissed the Oneida land claim that had
been pending for over thirty years.23
All of the rules of equity had been thrown out in these rulings, such as
the balancing of equities; but they have created a new “equity defense” that
only applies to Indian nations’ land cases and ignores almost every
historical rule of equity.24 The fact that the State of New York knowingly
acted illegally — in violation of treaties, the Trade and Intercourse Act, and
the U.S. Constitution — should have resulted in court recognition that the
State did not have “clean hands” and should therefore not have been
entitled to invoke an equitable defense.25 The Haudenosaunee land rights
cases are based upon illegal takings of the land by New York in the 1790s
and early 1800s, which the State has not denied, and in other cases, has
been proven through long factual hearings.
New York needed the land after the Revolutionary War because it had no
money and it needed to pay its soldiers. So New York carved up the region
in maps for military tracts before ever stealing the land. These takings of
20. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005).
21. City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
22. See Kathryn Fort, Disruption and Impossibility: The New Laches and the
Unfortunate Resolution of the Modern Iroquois Land Claims, 11 WYO. L. REV. 375 (2011)
[hereinafter Fort, Disruption]; Kathryn E. Fort, The New Laches: Creating Title Where None
Existed, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357 (2009); Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida
Indian Nations of New York: A Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Cohen’s
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 41 TULSA L. REV. 5 (2005); Wenona T. Singel &
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. REV. 21
(2005); Joseph William Singer, Nine-tenths of the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred
Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006).
23. Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010).
24. Fort, Disruption, supra note 22, at 402.
25. Id.
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Haudenosaunee lands by New York were such a problem for President
George Washington and the new government that in 1790, Washington had
Congress pass the Trade and Intercourse Act (“Act”), which is now 25
U.S.C. § 177. Essentially, this is a very simple law that says no party can
take Indian land without federal involvement and federal ratification.26
This Act applies to everybody, including the states, and if any party takes
Indian land in violation of those two simple rules, then the transfers are
void.
The Act was directly aimed at New York because New York was taking
Haudenosaunee lands progressively.27 Washington’s army was losing the
war in Ohio and he could not afford to have the Senecas and other
Haudenosaunee warriors join that war. New York kept taking the land and
these takings violated the Constitution, the Act, and the last treaty the Six
Nations made with the United States — the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua.28
Five of the Six Nations filed land claims. The Onondagas filed what
they called a land rights action because they did not claim possession of the
land, they just asked for a declaratory judgment stating New York had
violated the law and therefore the transactions were void.29 In response,
the Second Circuit has made up a new rule that says, ”It is not fair for you
to bring these issues forward now because this is too disruptive of the
expectations of the landowners.” So there only are two elements in this
“new laches” defense: (1) A long passage of time, and (2) a judicially
noticed disruption of the “reasonable expectations” of the non-natives that
have taken over the land.
If you think about that, this framework is based upon removal, because
one of the factors considered in this “new laches” defense is that all Indians
have “moved away” and non-Indians, almost exclusively, now use the land.
And disturbingly, these dismissals are being done under the guise of
“equity.” The final insult is that this “new laches” defense only applies to
Indian land claims.30 This is the background and framework that sets up the
Onondaga’s challenge of arguing the land claim action on Columbus Day in
the Second Circuit — yes, the irony is profound.31
26. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006).
27. LAURENCE M. HAUPTMAN, CONSPIRACY OF INTERESTS: IROQUOIS DISPOSSESSION AND
THE RISE OF NEW YORK STATE (2001).
28. Id.
29. Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-cv-0314, 2010 WL 3806492, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010).
30. Fort, Disruption, supra note 22, at 402.
31. One week after the oral argument, the Circuit issued a summary denial of the appeal.
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The Onondaga case was filed just weeks before the City of Sherrill v.
Oneida Indian Nation of New York decision, and so we amended the
complaint, which eventually was dismissed by the district court after the
Oneida land claim32 was dismissed in the Second Circuit.
Of course, we all know that federal Indian law is founded on the
problematic and racist doctrine of discovery.33 The lands were taken
illegally, and New York did not even deny any of these facts. They filed a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)34 (“Rule 12(b)”) motion, which
essentially says it does not matter if any of the proposed facts are true. The
State did not deny any of the facts by filing this motion. The State claims
that it’s just not fair for the nations to bring these illegal land takings up
anymore, because that is “inequitable” to the current non-Indian
landowners.
We (the Onondaga) will see what the Second Circuit does with our case.
The challenge on this appeal is particularly difficult because the three-judge
panel cannot rule against their prior rulings and dismissals in Cayuga35 and
Oneida.36 We are trying to convince the panel that our case is
fundamentally different. We did not sue any individuals; we sued the state,
the city, and the county because we needed lesser governments to remain as
defendants when the state exercises its Eleventh Amendment immunity. We
also sued five corporate defendants, and those corporate defendants are the
major polluters in the area.
One of them is Honeywell, which is actually owned by Allied Chemical
(“Allied”). The company kept the Honeywell name because it sounds
“cleaner.” Over a century, Allied and Honeywell heavily polluted and
ruined Onondaga Lake, the sacred lake where the confederacy was born.37
The lake is the birthplace of western democracy.38 The lake used to be so

See Onondada Nation v. New York, 500 F. App’x 87 (2d Cir. 2012). The Nation filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, which the Court denied on October 15,
2013. See Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 12-1279, 2013 WL 1774236 (U.S. Oct. 15,
2013).
32. See Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010).
33. See generally LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF
AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b).
35. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005).
36. Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010).
37. See LEWIS HENRY MORGAN, LEAGUE OF THE IROQUOIS 7 (1851).
38. H.R. CON. RES. 331, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988); see DONALD A. GRINDE, THE
IROQUOIS AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN NATION (1977).
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abundant with fish that people wrote about it in the 1700s;39 but these
companies have turned it into the most polluted lake in the country. So
those are the kinds of defendants we targeted. However, one of the major
problems we face now is this “new laches” defense.
With the loss of its land, the Onondaga and its people have been
deprived of their spiritual, cultural and historic relationship with the land,
including the lake and other water bodies. They can no longer fish, or eat
any fish they might catch, due to the heavy contamination of mercury and
twenty-six other toxic chemicals in the lake sediment. Without legal
recognition of property rights, the Onondaga have no authority to dictate
how the land and waters are used. This means that it is much harder for the
Onondaga to protect its environmental interests, to protect sacred sites, and
to protect the unmarked graves of their ancestors.40
New York is one of only four states in the nation that has no state law
protecting unmarked graves.41 We also do a lot of repatriation work. We
try to prevent groups from digging up un-marked graves, which happens
often in upstate New York these days. Onondaga used to live on and use
two and a half million acres running from the eastern end of Lake Ontario42
through the center of New York, down into Pennsylvania. But Onondaga is
now confined to 7500 acres. They used to fish extensively throughout the
aboriginal territory; one-third of their diet was fish.43 They are now
confined to a small territory where the only body of water is Onondaga
Creek.
I keep using the name Onondaga because their presence and ties to this
land are very well recognized and accepted by the local people.44 We have a
very positive relationship with the local governments. However, in the last
fifty years, the creek has been turned from a clean trout stream into a
muddy mess because of a solution salt mining industry upstream. This
mined salt was then used in chemical processes that polluted the lake.

39. See JOHN BARTRAM, LEWIS EVANS & CONRAD WEISER, A JOURNEY FROM
PENNSYLVANIA TO ONONDAGA IN 1743 (1973).
40. See Christopher A. Amato, Digging Sacred Ground: Burial Site Disturbances and
the Loss of New York’s Native American Heritage, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2002).
41. Id.
42. See BARTRAM, EVANS & WEISER, supra note 39.
43. Id. at 64-65.
44. See Editorial, Sacred Land: Proposal to Return Parcel to Onondagas a Worthy
Idea, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), May 2, 2011, http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2011/05/
sacred_land_proposal_to_return.html.
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We also have a phenomenon called “mudboils,” which are the result of
solution salt mining.45 It is a process by which companies have drilled
hundreds of wells about 1300 feet in the ground and used the water from
nearby kettle and glacier lakes to flush the salt out of the bottom of the
valley, leaving this huge vacuum in those salt cavities.46 This process has
caused subsidence, sinkholes, and rock fissures, leaving gaps in the surface
rock four feet across. This kind of damage has interfered with the aquifer
to the extent that now thirty tons of silt come up spontaneously on a daily
basis, in an almost geyser-like phenomenon. That silt ends up in the creek.
We have elders who can remember fishing in the creek at night with a
kerosene lantern and spearing trout — it was a pretty clean stream. You
can’t even see three inches into this creek anymore.
A lot of our work these days in central New York is fighting
hydrofracking.47 Chesapeake, Exxon, Halliburton, and other oil and gas
companies are poised to frack the Finger Lakes.48 For those of you who
don’t know about hydrofracking, the process uses about eight million
gallons of water per frack. Companies drill down thousands of feet
horizontally into the shale formation and break (or fracture) the shale
formations using water that is polluted with chemicals. The water then
comes back up partially radioactive, highly salty with hundreds of
chemicals.49
Fracking destroys millions of gallons of water per frack.50 It takes the
water out of the water cycle and puts it in the ground and buries it, thereby
permanently removing billions of gallons of fresh water from the

45. See WILLIAM M. KAPPEL, DONALD A. SHERWOOD & WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, HYDROGEOLOGY OF THE TULLY VALLEY AND CHARACTERIZATION OF
MUDBOIL ACTIVITY, ONONDAGA COUNTY, NEW YORK 2 (Water-Resources Investigations
Report 96-4043, 1996), available at http://ny.water.usgs.gov/pubs/wri/wri964043/WRIR964043.pdf.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Charles Ellis, Protesters in Syracuse Call for Statewide Ban on Hydrofracking,
POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), June 14, 2012, http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2012/
06/protesters_in_syracuse_call_fo.html.
48. See Andrew Zepp & W. Stuart Schweitzer, Letter to the Editor, Hydrofracking
Threatens Finger Lakes Region, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Oct. 18, 2011, http://blog.
syracuse.com/opinion/2011/10/hydrofracking_threatens_finger.html.
49. Chris Mooney, The Truth About Fracking, SCI. AM., Nov. 2011, at 81, available at
http://www.acfan.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/truth-casings.pdf.
50. Marie Morelli, Environmentalists Meet in Syracuse to Learn About ‘Hydrofracking’
and How They Can Try to Stop It, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Oct. 29, 2009,
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/environmentalists_meet_in_syra.html.
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worldwide water cycle. We do a lot of work fighting that,51 and we work
with our non-Native neighbors in accordance with the direction of the
Council of Chiefs. This work inspires me to publicly speak three or four
times a week. The Chiefs go to the state capitol building in Albany when
there are rallies. We want to protect the natural world so it can heal, not
only the natural world, but also repairing the strained relationships resulting
from centuries of settler invasions.
Another problem that we are dealing with a little more is gaining
acceptance of the Onondaga’s traditional governmental structure. The
Onondaga does not have Anglo-style courts. It does not have three branches
of government. It does not have a written constitution. But it does have its
own traditional customs and institutions.52
It is incredibly hard for non-Native people to accept how the Chiefs and
Clan Mothers make decisions.53 We are often confronted with questions
like, “What is it about these custody arrangements that make you want us to
honor them?” So we are working with courts and outside agencies to gain
acceptance and recognition of Onondaga birth certificates, marriages, and
dead feasts.54 Dead feasts are the Onondaga’s way of resolving what
happens to property and land after death. We have encountered some
difficult issues with the lack of respect and recognition of dead feasts.
Finally, an issue you may have heard about is that the Onondaga have
always rejected United States citizenship. The Onondaga rejected the 1924
Citizenship Act immediately with a letter to the President.55 An Onondaga
chief, Jessie Lyons, went to Washington D.C. carrying wampum belts as a
way of saying, “We are Haudenosaunee citizens, not U.S. citizens.”56
Nation citizens travel using Onondaga passports and have done so for over
thirty years. Now, the United States is refusing to recognize those passports

51. Sarah Moses, Onondaga Nation to Host Anti-Hydrofracking Music Festival, POSTSTANDARD (Syracuse), Sept. 7, 2012, http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2012/09/
onondaga_nation_to_host_anti-h.html.
52. Heath, supra note 16.
53. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960).
54. George v. Pierce, 85 Misc. 105, 127-28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914).
55. Laurence M. Hauptman, Congress, Plenary Power, and the American Indian, 1870
to 1992, in EXILED IN THE LAND OF THE FREE: DEMOCRACY, INDIAN NATIONS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 317 (Chief Oren Lyons & John Mohawk eds., 1992).
56. Howard McLellan, Indian Magna Carta Writ in Wampum Belts: Six Nations Shows
Treaty Granting Them Independent Sovereignty as Long as Sun Shines, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1925, available at http://www.ratical.org/many_worlds/6Nations/WampumBelts.html.
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and is preventing them from traveling internationally.57 We do a lot of
work in the United Nations. The Onondaga’s lacrosse team competes on
the international level with the United States, Canada, and other countries.
The tribe just won a bronze medal in the world games this summer in
Europe, but traveling with their own passports has become more and more
of a challenge.
Those are the issues that we work with every day. There are many
others, but I have a very limited amount of time.
Thank you for listening.
Pat Sekaquaptewa, Executive Director, Nakwatsvewat Institute
My name is Pat Sekaquaptewa. I am a member of the Hopi Tribe and
the Village of Hotevilla, located in northeastern Arizona. I currently serve
as the Executive Director of the Nakwatsvewat Institute, a non-profit
committed to working with tribes to further their justice, governance, and
educational institutions. I have also served for five years as the Executive
Director of the UCLA School of Law’s Native Nations Institute and its
Tribal Legal Development Clinic. I have also served as an Appellate
Justice for a number of tribal courts, including my own.
I was asked to speak today in response to Professor Frickey’s
observation that federal judges have no way to have a broader, balanced
view of tribal institutions. Professor Frickey felt there is a failure of
scholarship in federal Indian law in that the work does not grapple with the
law on the ground in Indian Country. He also felt that the federal courts
and Congress need strong contextual arguments to show how tribal
institutions operate. As I was preparing my remarks, something really
jumped out at me. As legal scholars we are stuck in the middle. Even
Native legal scholars are stuck in the middle. We have powerful decision
makers in Congress and the federal judiciary whose decision-making seems
purely discretionary to us in Indian Country. What they seem to be looking
for is a good story that will tug at the heart so they will be compelled to
make or find some law in favor of the tribal communities.
This does not feel like a rule of law kind of thing or a justice kind of
thing. So, as advocates and legal scholars, we tell a good story in order to
win battles for our people; but we are stuck in the middle because in tribal
communities, even our own leaders and community members are very
suspicious of us (lawyers), for good reason. All you have to do is walk
57. Charles McChesney, Iroquois Nation Passports Have Worked For Years, Attorney
Says, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), July 13, 2010, http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/
2010/07/iroquois_nation_passports_have.html.
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back through the cases in federal Indian law to see it. Also, every tribal
community has its own tragic history with non-Indians. So how are legal
scholars supposed to develop scholarship for use by congressmen and
federal judges? How are we supposed to tell an accurate story if we can’t
get access to the information from our own communities?
It is simultaneously true that in the U.S. legal system, the law is made
and put in books. But in Indian Country, the law is in the people and in their
relationships.58 I do a lot of work with custom and tradition as law in Indian
Country. Many tribal constitutions, codes, resolutions, and court rules
recognize custom law as a valid source of law that is enforceable in tribal
courts.59
The U.S. federal system also recognizes tribal custom law to the extent
that it recognizes the case law coming out of the tribal court systems — and
in certain areas it is recognized and applied via federal statutes.60 But
where does custom law come from? It resides in the people. It resides in
the practices and norms that come out of the community. Many of the
elders know it. Many of the community members live it. The law is in the
people and it is reinforced in their everyday lives. You can’t look it up on
your computer. You can’t Google it easily — or maybe you Google it and
58. See generally Pat Sekaquaptewa, Key Concepts in the Finding, Definition and
Consideration of Custom Law in Tribal Lawmaking, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319 (20072008).
59. See Hopi Tribal Resolution H-12-76, § 2(a) (“The Courts of the Hopi Tribe, in
deciding matters of both substance and procedure, in cases otherwise properly before the
Courts of the Hopi Tribe, shall look to and give weight as precedent to, the following: (1) the
Hopi Constitution and Bylaws; (2) Ordinances of the Hopi Tribe Council; (3) Resolutions of
the Hopi Tribe Council; (4) Customs, traditions and culture of the Hopi Tribe; (5) Laws,
rules, and regulations of the Federal Government and the cases interpreting such . . . .; (6)
The laws and rules, and cases interpreting such laws and rules, of the state of Arizona; [and]
(7) The Common Law.”). However, under section 2(b), the Courts of the Hopi Tribe shall
not recognize nor apply any federal, state, or common law rule or procedure which is
inconsistent with either the spirit or the letter of the Hopi Constitution, ordinances,
resolutions, or the custom, traditions, or culture of the Hopi Tribe. Id. § 2(b). Under Hopi
case law, federal and state laws are considered persuasive but not mandatory authority. Hopi
Tribe v. Consolidated Cases of Mahkewa, 25 Indian L. Rep. 6144, 6145 (Hopi App. Ct.
1995). The Hopi Appellate Court has also held that relevant custom must be considered
before the application of foreign law (federal and state laws) in the Hopi tribal courts. Hopi
Indian Credit Ass’n v. Thomas, 27 Indian L. Rep. 6039, 6040 (Hopi App. Ct. 1996); see also
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 13
MICH. J. RACE & L. 57 (2007) (discussing comparative tribal provisions); Sekaquaptewa,
supra note 58, at 380-81 (discussing comparative provisions establishing tribal custom).
60. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) (2006) (defining extended family member “by law or
custom of the Indian child’s tribe” under The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978).
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you don’t know when you are seeing it — but it is there. You can’t look it
up on Lexis or Westlaw unless one of us has written a law review article. I
do want to acknowledge those lawyers and practitioners who are doing case
studies with particular tribes and who are trying to share their observations
because that is extremely valuable.61
How are we supposed to
communicate the importance of tribal values, practices, and motivations if
we can’t gain access to the information from our own communities?
There are some basic facts of life given this dilemma. Legal scholars
have to earn trust and access in tribal communities to get the information
we would then put in law review articles. We also must provide a
compelling context for our congressmen and federal judges and for
lawmakers on other levels. And we must simultaneously educate people
about tribal institutions and values. But often, the compelling context is
more important strategically than the education because if federal judges
are not swayed by a good story in the context of their value system, they
may not care much about the information.
So that makes it very important for us to provide a compelling context to
outside lawmakers and judges.
Otherwise, we can’t further our
communities’ interests. Even Native scholars must gain access to tribal
communities to get information in order to build and describe these
contexts to others. Successful legal scholars today earn trust and access to
tribal communities by exchanging services and by helping tribes develop
their infrastructure.62 We don’t get to extract information from tribal
communities because we went to school and are very smart and can publish
articles. We have to trade for it. We have to earn trust and live up to the
access that we will have in our tribal communities.
I made a list of strategies or recommendations for furthering this access.
The first is that faculty in law schools should incentivize research and
publication by their legal clinicians working with Indian Country. This
assumes that law schools have legal clinics serving Indian Country. What
is true for Native legal scholars is true for their academic institutions —
61. See, e.g., RENNARD STRICKLAND, THE FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM
CLAN TO COURT (1975); Justin B. Richland, “What Are You Going to Do with the Village’s
Knowledge?” Talking Tradition, Talking Law in Hopi Tribal Court, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
235 (2005); Robert Yazzie, “Watch Your Six”: An Indian Nation Judge’s View of 25 Years
of Indian Law, Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 497 (19981999); Howard L. Brown, The Navajo Nation’s Peacemaker Division: An Integrated,
Community-Based Dispute Resolution Forum, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 297 (2000).
62. See Indian Law Clinics, TRIBAL COURT CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.tribal-institute.
org/lists/clinics.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
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access requires trust that must be earned with service. Legal scholars
should also consider serving as tribal judges, and I know many do. If there
is a problem with judging and writing outside Indian Country, a case could
be made for why it is imperative to do it within and among tribal
communities when it is done carefully.
The third recommendation is that legal scholars should participate in
tribal law clinics and in tribal court clerkship programs as supervisors or
advisors so they get some sense of how disputes arise and how case law is
argued in tribal court. The fourth recommendation is that legal scholars,
clinicians, and their students get off their computers and go to the tribal
communities. I know that one of our U.S. Supreme Court Justices visited
the Hopi. This was likely part of the Tribal Supreme Court Project, a joint
project by the Native American Rights Fund (“NARF”) and the National
Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”), which tasked itself with
educating the justices and other federal judges on key aspects of federal
Indian law. In the summer of 2001, Justices O’Connor and Breyer took part
in a historic visit to Indian Country to observe tribal justice systems.63
Justice O’Connor actually showed up on the Hopi Reservation and met with
a Hopi judge to learn how our tribal court system works first-hand. Even
our U.S. Supreme Court Justices understood that this was an important
thing to do.
The fifth recommendation has to do with formal research. In researching
tribal court cases, legal scholars need to be careful to look at the entire case
file including the full recordings and transcripts at the trial level. There is
so much filtering that goes on, particularly if we have non-Indian lawyers
and judges working in tribal courts. Consequently they often inadvertently
filter out (or never see) the issues central to the tribal parties and relevant
custom law considerations. Further, when tribal judges (and I might argue
any judges) write their final opinions and orders, you are getting a
somewhat subjective view of the conflict given their gender and life
experiences and even of the law, which very often excludes custom law
issues raised by the parties.64 Where non-Indian lawyers and judges work
in tribal court, much gets “lost in translation,” so it is very important to look

63. NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, TRIBAL SUPREME COURT PROJECT: TEN YEAR REPORT 2
(Dec. 2011), available at http://sct.narf.org/updatememos/tsct-10-year-report.pdf.
64. See, e.g., Smith v. James, 2 Am. Tribal Law 319 (Hopi Ct. App. 1999)
Sekaquaptewa, supra note 58, at 335-65 (describing a trial judge framing a new customary
rule for women’s property rights but from a male perspective, and I would argue to leave
open the possibility of recognizing potential male property right by use).
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at the whole record if you are going to truly understand tribal conflicts and
court cases.
Finally, we need to expand the nature of our research and work with
researchers from other disciplines. There are other disciplines doing
empirical research that is critical in Indian Country.65 The more work I do
as a mediator with my own tribe, the more I wish I had a Ph.D. in
psychology. While there are no current reliable statistics, given both the
nature of the disputes that we handled in mediations and the feedback from
our community mediators, we believe that many, if not most of our people
and our leaders, have experienced or are experiencing trauma in their lives
including: 1) child abuse, 2) domestic violence, and 3) alcoholism. I also
perceive, given my work with tribes nationally, that child sexual abuse is a
very big problem in Indian Country. I am by no means the first to make
note of this.66 One expert describes the multiple risk factors that contribute
to a greater incidence of child sexual abuse on Indian reservations. Those
include poverty, unemployment, familial stresses, violence, geographic and
social isolation of families, weakened family structure due to a history of
federal policies such as mandatory placement of Indian children in boarding
schools and the Indian Adoption Project.67 These federal policies that
weaken family structures contribute to the breakdown of extended families,
the loss of traditional child-rearing practices, the absence of good parental
modeling, and newly learned dysfunctional behaviors such as sexual abuse
and physical punishment. Native American communities also have a higher
percentage of children, with younger than average populations.68 These
layers of trauma related to child abuse, domestic violence, and alcoholism
are affecting every aspect of our governance, our criminal justice systems,
and of course our family and work life.
65. See, e.g., JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION: THE LANGUAGE OF LAW
(2008).
66. See Larry EchoHawk, Child Sexual Abuse in Indian Country: Is the Guardian
Keeping in Mind the Seventh Generation, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 91-95 (2001)
(citing old and conflicting statistics on Indian child sexual abuse — for a period ending in
1998, the U.S. Bureau of Justice reported that Native American children experienced 19.8
cases of sexual abuse per 1000 children, second only to African Americans at 20.7 cases per
1000 children). EchoHawk shares the view that many professionals working with tribal
communities know that existing data is “scant,” and that the existing data fails to accurately
capture the depth of the problem. Id.
67. Id.
68. See KATHLEEN A. EARLE, CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS & NAT’L INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ASS’N, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: AN EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN DATA
11 (2000), available at http://www.nicwa.org/research/02.Child_Abuse.pdf.
IN HOPI TRIBAL COURT
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Tribes need research in the following areas involving conflict:
governance (tribal, sub-tribal, inter-tribal, and inter-governmental), property
(both real and personal), family, youth, and criminal cases. I also make the
following observations given my work with my own tribe and over a
hundred others nationally.
First, as tribal people, we live in a society of kin, not a society of
strangers. What often looks like an arms-length contract dispute is actually
a family law case in some aspect. For example, because most Hopis view
themselves as related by clan, and because the villages, as opposed to the
Hopi tribal courts, have original jurisdiction over family disputes under
Article III, Section 2 of the Hopi Constitution, it is common for an
opposing party in tribal court litigation to claim the court lacks jurisdiction
to hear a matter because the litigants in a contract dispute are related by
clan.69 It is also true that Hopi land disputes are invariably family disputes
where the traditional Hopi land tenure system is arguably based on clan use
rights.70
Second, some tribes have hybrid constitutions and governmental
institutions. The constitutions or other laws recognize governance powers
in both traditional leaders and in elected leaders simultaneously. The Hopi
Tribe, by way of example, has an Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”)
Constitution,71 but it recognizes the authority of each village’s traditional
leader to certify representatives to the tribal council.72 If any of you have
been watching the news on the Hopi within the last five or six years, you
know that we had a complete meltdown, largely over this issue, and our
government fell apart.73 There are perpetual tensions, both with respect to
values and with respect to what form governance structures should take in
the present and future given these hybrids.

69. See Coin v. Mowa, 25 Indian. L. Rep. 6208, 6208-10 (Hopi Ct. App. 1997).
70. See, e.g., Smith v. James, 2 Am. Tribal Law 319 (Hopi Ct. App. 1999); see also
Sekaquaptewa, supra note 58, at 332-46.
71. See CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/
IRA/hopicons.html.
72. Id. art. IV, § 4.
73. See S.J. Wilson, Hopi Tribal Council Suspends Chairman Nuvamsa — Nuvamsa
Asks Federal Government for an Investigation, NAVAJO-HOPI OBSERVER, Sept. 30, 2008,
http://www.navajohopiobserver.com/main.asp?Search=1&ArticleID=7231&SectionID=1&S
ubSectionID=1&S=1; see also Ben Nuvamsa, What I Wish I Knew Before I Took Office:
Emerging Leaders Seminar, Native Nations Institute for Leadership Management and
Policy — University of Arizona (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://nnidatabase.org/db/vid
eo/ben-nuvamsa-what-i-wish-i-knew-i-took-office (video presentation).
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Third, the currency in tribal communities may include far more than
money or property. With the Hopi for example, it is arguable that even
today the central currency is ceremonial knowledge and participation. Much
has been written on the Hopi villages’ elaborate ceremonial cycles.74 There
is an intimate connection between authority, property use rights, and Hopi
ceremonialism.75 If one doesn’t understand the connections between
authority, kinship, ceremonialism, and economy in a particular tribe, many
of the values and applications of both western and tribal law will not make
sense.
Fourth, in most tribes there is a law of reciprocal obligations in
operation — a sort of kin-based customary tort law that floats underneath
the western-influenced tribal codes and court system. These obligations are
delimited by the way one is related to another, and breaches inform who is
right and who is wrong and how one should be punished or rewarded.
Fifth, there may be multiple traditional and secular entities legitimately
vying for authority in the eyes of the tribal public. At Hopi, we find tribal,
village, and clan entities sharing or vying for exclusive authority over use
rights and property rights.76 When you talk about property law in Indian
Country, there are multiple authorities that may have a say about how
property is used or transferred, even given a federal land trust system. In
the eyes of the tribal public, there also may be another body of customary
property law operating underneath.
Sixth, in many tribal communities, family equals clan/band/village, etc.
and clan/band/village, etc. equals government. You cannot understand tribal
government unless you understand local government (clan/band/village,
etc.).
I have a big list of observations, but this gives you a sampling of what
tribal legal scholars have to be aware of in accessing and reporting on tribal
legal conflicts before they ever come into tribal court. Tribal conflicts are
simply much more complex and nuanced than one might observe from
looking at tribal court opinions and orders.
Finally, I would like to talk about the types of research and publications
that I would like to see based on what we are seeing on the ground in Indian
74. See, e.g. MISCHA TITIEV, OLD ORAIBI 103-78 (1972) (discussing basic patterns,
underlying concepts of Hopi ceremonies, and what he calls “the Kachina cult”).
75. Id. at 181-200; see also PETER M. WHITELEY, THE ORAYVI SPLIT: A HOPI
TRANSFORMATION: PART I: STRUCTURE AND HISTORY 21-31 (2008).
76. Sekaquaptewa, supra note 58, at 319, 346-51 (discussing legal levels and multiple
legal systems); see also PETER M. WHITELEY, RETHINKING HOPI ETHNOGRAPHY 80-104
(1998).
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Country. I think there needs to be more thinking on the structure and
process of therapeutic dockets in tribal trial courts, like drug and mental
health courts. There needs to be more on conflict theory and transformative
mediation methods in working with disputes that involve ongoing
relationships in tribal community. Custom law is more alive in mediation
than it is in tribal adjudication.
We also need to have more case studies focusing on living custom law
coming from specific tribes and specific conflict issues, and we need some
decoding for outside judges and lawmakers. I suspect that we will see one
track of law review articles for the community and its needs, and a second
track of law review articles that decodes the research for the non-Indian
public and federal decision makers. We must also write about what tribal
community members perceive to be needed in Indian Country versus what
the outside lawmakers and judges say. We badly need an internal forum to
dialogue about internal value and policy conflicts (for example, to game or
not to game).
Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to share my
experiences and my views in response to Professor Frickey’s valuable
observation that we desperately need to communicate the tribal realities to
those who have so much control over tribal lives and resources.
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Sarah Krakoff, Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School
Thanks again to Berkeley, Mary Louise, and everyone who helped to
organize this conference. I also want to thank my co-organizers who aren’t
up here on the panel. One of them is Scott Williams, and the other is Bob
Anderson. Professor Anderson is visiting at Harvard this fall and couldn’t
make the cross-country trip. It was the three of us, talking with Mary
Louise, who conceptualized and organized the panel and invited our
wonderful guests.
Our idea for this part of the conference was to hear from tribal people —
both elected officials and community leaders — about the challenges of
doing environmental work in Indian Country. If there will ever be
environmental justice in Indian Country, it will be because of them.
Without their voices and activism, the default practices of using tribal lands
and resources for the needs of development, mostly by non-Indians, will
continue unchallenged. There are lines of continuity between the content of
this panel and Judge Fletcher’s talk yesterday about sacred sites. Those
include the relentless pursuit of natural resource development, the
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accompanying problem of agency capture when that development is on
public lands, and the translation problems tribes face when challenging
development in judicial forums, which all pose significant challenges. To
add to the complexity, the translation problem is multi-layered, as you will
hear from the amazing speakers today. For some tribal members, getting
through to their own tribal governments can pose threshold challenges. If
that difficulty can be overcome, translating to outsiders — whether courts,
legislators or agencies — is the next daunting step in the process. At that
stage, lawyers and academics might be brought in to assist, but our work is
only as good as the work of the tribal and community leaders with whom
we are engaged in these efforts.
That is why we structured the panel the way that we did. So before
turning the rest of this time over to our speakers, I thought I would just add
a few more thoughts about the larger framing of this conference and how
we might think about what it means to heed Phil Frickey’s call.
I think there are several ways to make our scholarly work relevant, and
they take very different forms. First, there is the work academics do that
targets an academic audience, and there are reasons for that. Some of the
reasons are fairly instrumental. We have to get tenure and, like it or not, we
are mindful of U.S. News rankings and that kind of thing. But there are
other more important reasons having to do with the nature of scholarship
itself. We are writing — and should be doing so — for the long term.
Sometimes our work takes many years (and pages) to work through
complicated and subtle concepts. A great deal of the scholarly work
undertaken by American Indian law professors is very engaged work, even
if it is of a more remote and sequestered nature. A scholarly project often
begins with a puzzle relevant to contemporary American Indian law; but
piecing the puzzle together may take years of painstaking historical
research, mountains of data, pages of dense theoretical analysis, or all of the
above. So, while almost all American Indian law scholars are motivated by
the larger question of doing justice in Indian Country, that does not mean
our work can or will instantly achieve such an outcome.
It was refreshing to hear Judge Fletcher talk about the very limited extent
to which judges actually read law review articles, and who can blame them?
They are very long with a lot of footnotes. They are not often directly or
instrumentally helpful, and they are not supposed to be. But in the long
run, if done well and in the right spirit, they provide deep context for
practical and instrumental problem solving, and they do so in a way no
other resources can.
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The second way scholars can engage with legal issues is through a
category of scholarship I think of as “service scholarship,” which includes
treatises as well as shorter, more practical pieces that can be used by
legislators, policy makers, and judges. To do this work well, one needs a
deeper intellectual grounding in the field, which can only be achieved by
spending a lot of time doing the first kind of scholarship. A great treatise,
in my opinion, can only be written after being steeped in a field’s
complexities. Similarly, someone who knows the long, impractical context
of a subject can best write a short, practical guide. It is my rough sense that
American Indian law professors do as much or more service scholarship as
any other sub-category of legal academics. As a group, we tend to be very
engaged with the communities in which our work has the biggest impact,
and therefore take the service obligations to heart, including how we spend
our time writing.
Third, teaching is a way to engage immediate problems and issues in the
field, and includes recruiting students to write shorter papers that provide
direct assistance to tribes and tribal communities. To provide just one
example, I took my seminar class on a field trip to the Navajo Nation,
where we met and stayed with two of our panelists here today. They were
gracious enough to host us on their lands in the Hard Rock Chapter.
Several of my students dramatically changed their paper topics after hearing
about the legal challenges confronting the people of Black Mesa. They
wanted their papers to matter, and I have little doubt that in the end they
did.
Finally, many American Indian law professors engage in pro bono work,
often in ways that connect with our scholarship. So another way to make
the first category — the longer articles and books that take years to write —
relevant is to do pro bono work that draws on that knowledge. Whenever
my colleagues and I assist practicing lawyers in this way, we are struck by
the help we can provide to the pressing issues that practitioners and their
clients face every day.
In all these ways, academics can contribute to the goal of achieving
justice in Indian Country. With so many options, there are no excuses for
not bending at least some of our work toward that end. As we hear our
panelists talk about these hard and complex issues they have been working
on in their communities, we can think about how we can engage our own
communities in one or more of these ways. Maybe we won’t have to wait
for them to tell us how we can make our work relevant. Just listen closely
and then go do it!
***
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Thank you to all of our panelists. I just have a few observations about
the themes I have heard throughout all the presentations. One is how clear
it is that contemporary American Indian law is, if seen in its best light, an
attempt at reconciliation. Indian law today has to reconcile the laws and
policies of the past, which were largely rationalizations for the non-Indian
settlement of the continent, with contemporary values and goals of tribal
survivalism and self-determination. Reckoning with Indian law’s darker
origins is not merely a paper exercise; it entails confronting the violence
and pain inflicted on tribal people. We heard quite explicitly about Indian
law’s violent past from all of the speakers in different ways. Hawk
Rosales’s story stands out in particular as a personal one and, yet, not a
singular one.
In almost every Native family, there are similar stories written on the
backs of grandmothers, grandfathers, aunts, and uncles. This is a difficult
and complicated backdrop against which to work out pressing
contemporary problems of environmental justice. Most of us cannot do the
work that was just described by the members of the panel. Most of us are
not equipped to do that work because we are not from tribal communities.
But we can provide the translation, the technical assistance, and often the
explanation of how and why these conflicts have arisen in the form they
have today.
Think about Madelyn’s story, too. If you know the legal doctrine of
Indian water rights, you might be very puzzled as to why her tribe cannot
immediately fend off the Southern Nevada Water Authority. After all, the
Winters doctrine says tribes have a priority right to water to fulfill the
purpose of their reservation lands, and that right predates all other western
water rights.77 So what is the problem? Why can the tribe not assert its
legal right and block the actions that would syphon its water to Las Vegas?
The problem is that Winters rights clash with our western water law
doctrine of prior appropriation, which gives priority to water users who
divert and use the water first. More importantly, the prior appropriation
doctrine is not just the law, it is the practice on the ground. As the cliché
goes, water flows uphill toward money. The first (and most powerful)
entity to divert water often wins, regardless of how strong a tribe’s paper
rights might be.
This is evident in Nicole and Marshall’s story, too. The Navajo Nation,
notwithstanding an 1868 treaty that guarantees higher priority water rights
77. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (finding that tribes have reserved
rights to water that date to the time their reservations were established).
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than any other entity in the four corners region, is last in line to obtain
rights to surface water and even harder pressed to protect its sacred
groundwater. The natural resources of the Colorado Plateau, and Black
Mesa in particular, have been exported to support development outside of
Indian Country, leaving the Navajo and Hopi communities to struggle for
water and energy to meet their basic needs. Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Las
Vegas have turned repeatedly to the coal-rich high desert plateau without
heed of the effects on communities that call the area home.
So these are just a few among many themes that the speakers have
presented to us. They give us some ideas about how we can help at the
margins to solve some of these puzzles and engage in acts of translation for
legislators and judges.
Hawk Rosales, Executive Director, InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness
Council
Good morning. My name is Hawk Rosales. I am the Executive Director
of the InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness Council. We are based in
Mendocino County and we are a nonprofit consortium of ten federally
recognized tribes,78 founded in 1986 for the purpose of cultural
conservation of ancestral tribal lands in southern Humboldt County and
Mendocino County. Today I am going to talk about how we have been
working with legal scholars and using appropriate legal tools to secure
recognition, for the first time in the State of California, for the aboriginal
rights of the tribes affected by the Marine Life Protection Act (“MLPA”)
process in the marine areas of Northern California.
I am going to give some background about how our organization was
formed and the type of work we do. The Sinkyone tribal ancestral territory
is a fairly large area of land. The upper part of this territory is located in
Humboldt County and the lower part is located in Mendocino County. This
is a very remote and beautiful coastal area within the redwood rainforest
ecosystem. It cannot be compared to any other place in the world. This is
the area in which we work.

78. The ten member tribes of the InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness Council are: Cahto
Tribe; Coyote Valley Reservation; Hopland Band of Pomo Indians; Pinoleville Pomo
Nation; Potter Valley Tribe; Redwood Valley Rancheria of Pomo Indians; Robinson
Rancheria Band of Pomo Indians; Round Valley Indian Tribes; Scotts Valley Band of Pomo
Indians; and Sherwood Valley Rancheria of Pomo Indians. Each of these tribes is a
sovereign nation that retains ancient ancestral and cultural ties to the aboriginal Sinkyone
tribal territory.
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A number of Sinkyone stream valleys flow down into the ocean. The sea
cliffs here are about 2000 feet in elevation; but these coastal streams go
back into the mountains for many miles, and contain a huge variety of
wildlife and cultural resources that the tribes still depend on for subsistence.
Bear Harbor is located toward the northern end of the Sinkyone territory.
The Roosevelt elk are an important part of the redwood and marine
ecosystem. Every year, these elk go swimming about a mile out into the
ocean. We don’t know how many of them make it back. We haven’t
counted, but apparently most of them do. This practice may be part of their
instinct because they are related to the caribou, which also travel between
islands farther north.
The redwood tree is a very sacred part of the tribal culture in this region.
Some of these redwoods are 5000 years old, and every aspect of the tribal
culture is dependent upon this tree. In the 1960s, most of the old growth
along the Sinkyone coastline was still intact. Looking at a photo taken
fifteen years later, massive clear cutting is evident throughout all of these
watersheds. The result has been severe degradation of the entire ecosystem.
To this day, we are still dealing with the cumulative effects.
In 1983, a lawsuit was brought by the Environmental Information
Protection Center and the International Indian Treaty Council against the
Georgia-Pacific Corporation (“Georgia-Pacific”), the California Board of
Forestry, and the California Department of Forestry to force compliance
with existing state standards for protection of natural and cultural
resources.79 Also known as the “Sally Bell Case,” the lawsuit charged the
landowner and responsible state agencies with violations of the California
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”).80
Georgia-Pacific, which owned the property, was found responsible for
knowingly destroying Native American cultural resources. In 1985, the
California appellate court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.81 Eventually, the
case resulted in a revision of the timber harvest rules for California. The
Sally Bell Grove was saved as a result of that lawsuit. The entire grove
contains about ninety acres of old growth. Only 2% of the old growth
redwoods remain in this area. The Sinkyone Council was formed one year
after the Sally Bell Case to address permanent protection and restoration of
Sinkyone lands, including those affected by the lawsuit.

79. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Johnson, 216 Cal. Rptr. 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st 1985).
80. See Epic v. Johnson I, ENVTL. PROTECTION INFO. CENTER, http://www.wildcaliforn
ia.org/case-history/case-documentation/1980s/epic-v-johnson-i/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
81. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 216 Cal. Rptr. at 519-20.
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The Sinkyone Council has been working all of these years to move
toward environmental and social justice for tribal peoples who were
removed from this land. Following the initial genocide of the Sinkyone and
nearby tribes, the relative that is so sacred to the Indian people — the
redwood tree — was cut down without restraint. Sally Bell was a survivor
of one of the many massacres that occurred in this area during the mid1800s, and the woman in whose honor the lawsuit was named. In the late
1920s, Sally Bell recounted the massacre:
My grandfather and all of my family — my mother, my father,
and we — were around the house and not hurting anyone. Soon,
about ten o’clock in the morning, some white men came. They
killed my grandfather and my mother and my father. I saw them
do it. I was a big girl at the time. Then they killed my baby sister
and cut her heart out and threw it in the brush where I ran and
hid. My little sister was a baby, just crawling around. I didn’t
know what to do. I was so scared that I guess I just hid there a
long time with my little sister’s heart in my hands. I felt so bad
and I was so scared that I just couldn’t do anything else. Then I
ran into the woods and hid there for a long time. I lived there a
long time with a few other people who had got away. We lived
on berries and roots and we didn’t dare build a fire because the
white men might come back after us. So we ate anything that we
could get . . . .82
Unfortunately, this was not an unusual story for California Indian people
during that time. Many tribes were completely annihilated. But there were
survivors, and those survivors are the forebears of Indian families who
became members of the ten tribes that comprise the Sinkyone Council tribal
consortium. Since our inception, our effort has been to reclaim traditional
tribal stewardship for Sinkyone lands by the original descendants through
restoring the tribal presence and the natural ecosystem. In 1997 we
purchased 3845 acres of ancestral Sinkyone land from The Trust for Public
Land, and thereby established the first ever inter-tribal Indian wilderness
area on the Sinkyone coastal lands that were sold by Georgia-Pacific
following the Sally Bell Case decision.
It is important to understand that Congress refused to ratify all eighteen
of the treaties agreed to and signed in good faith between California Indian

82. GLADYS A. NOMLAND, SINKYONE NOTES 166-67 (1935).
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tribes and the federal government.83 As a result, aboriginal rights of
California tribes are not recognized outside of reservation boundaries. It has
been a tremendous challenge to get these rights recognized by the State of
California. This has been the focus of much of our effort over the past few
years: returning tribal presence to these lands in order to bring back the
spirituality and the cultural practices has been the main focus of our work
during the last twenty years. We have conducted a lot of salmon restoration
work, and we focus on several areas of traditional cultural uses on this
land.84
We work with many partners, and all of this work that we have been
doing has led to our engagement in the MLPA process. We have many
restoration projects in the Sinkyone coastal watersheds. We have partnered
with California State Parks in removing old logging roads to address mass
erosion problems. All of these projects are directly related to protecting and
improving the health of the ocean. In our work to honor and protect the
cultural ecology of this coastal area, we began engaging in 2009 with the
MLPA Initiative.
The MLPA is a California statute passed by the state legislature in 1999
and is designed to protect the ocean ecosystem. It did not include any
consideration for the tribes and their traditional uses of the marine protected
areas (“MPAs”) that the State of California intended to establish up and
down the coastline. When this process reached the north coast, the tribes
began organizing, meeting, and attending every single one of the blue
ribbon task force, regional stakeholder group, and other MLPA Initiative
meetings. Twenty-six federally recognized tribes in the north coast were
affected.85 In the regions to the south, there was a much more limited
83. Who We Are, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.bia.
gov/WhoWeAre/RegionalOffices/Pacific/WeAre/index.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
84. Hawk Rosales, Executive Director, InterTribal Sinkyone Wilderness Council,
Address at the University of California Berkeley Law Symposium: Doing Justice in Indian
Country (Sept. 27-28, 2012) (on file with author). These areas include, as listed in the
September 28, 2012 Sinkyone Council PowerPoint Presentation: traditional harvest of
culturally important plants and animals; ceremony; protection and stewardship of sacred and
other cultural sites; restoration of the land’s cultural/ecological values (water quality, fish
habitat, basketmaking plant stands, endangered species’ habitat, etc.); reintroduction of
traditional fire management regime; reduction of fuel-load hazardous areas; culturalrecreational activities; cultural-educational programs; youth and elders gatherings; and
backcountry recreation, including hiking trails network.
85. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, 77 Fed. Reg. 47868 (Aug. 10, 2012), available at http://www.loc.gov/catdir/
cpso/biaind.pdf. The counties affected and names of the tribes are:
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presence of tribes in the coastal areas. The game completely changed when
California introduced the MLPA Initiative to the north coast.
Since the beginning of time, the tribes have been the careful stewards of
their coastal lands and waters. Their stewardship has enabled diversity and
abundance of a multitude of marine species and habitats. The wellbeing of
plant and animal communities has been made possible for generations
through the tribes’ implementation of traditional ecological knowledge. The
State’s agencies and resource managers are only now beginning to
understand this complex and vital dynamic.
During this process, we worked with many allies to convince California
to change the marine-take regulations so that there would be a formal
recognition of tribal use rights with respect to traditional and
noncommercial fishing and the gathering and harvesting of shellfish,
finfish, and marine plants. We have been able to change the regulations,
through a very long process and with a lot of help from people like Sarah
Krakoff, Curtis Berkey, Scott Williams, and many others, who graciously
provided legal opinions on how California could structure a tribal marineuse regulation. It has been a time-consuming process, but on June 6 of this
year [2012], the California Fish and Game Commission finally approved a
regulation that formally recognizes and protects tribal traditional uses in
each one of the State Marine Conservation Areas (“SMCAs”) that were
established in the north coast.
In our research to achieve this success, we found many old tribal
photographs that showed families living on the coast — right at the
proposed MPAs — in a traditional manner up until the 1920s and 1930s.
These are the families that today are represented through the Sinkyone
Council. They continue to use these areas as their ancestors did, and they
always will do so.
Mendocino County (ten tribes): Cahto Tribe; Coyote Valley Reservation; Guidiville
Rancheria; Hopland Band of Pomo Indians; Manchester Band of Pomo Indians; Pinoleville
Pomo Nation; Potter Valley Tribe; Redwood Valley Rancheria of Pomo Indians; Round
Valley Indian Tribes; Sherwood Valley Rancheria of Pomo Indians.
Lake County (seven tribes): Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians; Elem Indian Colony of
Pomo Indians; Habematolel Pomo of Upper Lake; Lower Lake Rancheria; Middletown
Rancheria of Pomo Indians; Robinson Rancheria Band of Pomo Indians; Scotts Valley
Band of Pomo Indians.
Humboldt County (five tribes): Bear River Band of Rohnerville Rancheria; Big Lagoon
Rancheria; Blue Lake Rancheria; Cher-Ae Heights Indian Community of Trinidad
Rancheria; Wiyot Tribe.
Del Norte County (four tribes): Elk Valley Rancheria; Resighini Rancheria; Smith River
Rancheria; Yurok Tribe.
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This victory is an example of a successful collaborative approach that
required carefully negotiating with California through administrative
channels, instead of through litigation or legislation. It was all about
building a solution whereby we could achieve dual protections for the
environment and the tribes’ traditional subsistence uses. All of the uses
allowed by California before these new regulations go into effect will
remain in place for the tribes that are listed for these MPAs. But the public
will not be allowed the same extractive uses in those MPAs.
For the first time, north coast tribes have received formal recognition by
California of their marine use rights through a new and distinct category of
use that stands separate from the recreational and commercial categories.
We view this as a huge victory for California tribes. The MLPA process has
been far from perfect, and not everyone was happy with the outcome; but in
the southern bio-region of the north coast (from the mouth of the Mattole
River to Point Arena) seventeen federally recognized tribes in Mendocino
and Lake Counties were included in this area’s six new SMCAs, and one
federally recognized tribe in Humboldt County was included in one of those
SMCAs. Four federally recognized tribes in Humboldt and Del Norte
Counties were included in four new SMCAs and one new state marine
recreational management area in the north coast’s northern bio-region (from
the Oregon border to the mouth of the Mattole River).86
Tribal engagement in the MLPA process demonstrates that when people
pull together and work towards something good, both environmental
protection and social justice can be achieved. And, we can change the way
the government views tribal sovereignty and aboriginal rights.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Sarah Deer, Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law87
Author’s preface: These remarks were originally delivered in September
of 2012. On March 7, 2013, President Obama signed the 2013 Violence
Against Women Act Reauthorization (“VAWA 2013”). Contained within
that legislation is a partial reauthorization of tribal criminal jurisdiction
86. Northern California Marine Protected Areas, CAL. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE,
http://www.dfg.ca.gov/mlpa/ncmpas_list.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2013) (final approved
regulation, including maps and details regarding tribal take).
87. Citizen of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation of Oklahoma. Mvto (thank you) to the
many Native women survivors and advocates who have informed my work on this issue. I
am grateful to Anna R. Light, who provided invaluable research assistance in finalizing
these remarks for publication.
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over non-Indians, which is a topic covered in this short essay. VAWA 2013
recognizes that the inherent right of tribal nations includes criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants accused of domestic violence. The
topics discussed in this essay — statistical evidence, interdiction of
violence, and protecting Native women — will likely become even more
important as tribal leaders and jurists consider the future of tribal selfdetermination and seek to realize the full potential of the changes created
by VAWA 2013.
Thank you very much for this opportunity. This is my first visit to
Berkeley and I am grateful that I have been invited to share some
information about my work.
At the outset, I would like to lay some foundation for my perspective on
Indian law. My introduction to law was based on my experience in victim
advocacy. Prior to going to law school (and during law school), I worked at
a rape crisis center in Lawrence, Kansas as an advocate for six years. Many
of the women I worked with were Native students at Haskell Indian Nations
University in Lawrence who had either been assaulted prior to coming to
Haskell or had been assaulted on campus. Through that work I began to see
a possible path of working in the legal system to help those women. My
plan was originally to work as a sex crimes prosecutor.
I ended up straying from that particular career path, but most of my work
continues to be informed by the experience of working directly with victims
of violent crime. Since law school, I have spoken to literally hundreds of
native women who have survived sexual assault or domestic violence (often
both) throughout Indian Country and in urban areas. Most of my
scholarship has focused on the needs and rights of those survivors.88
The statistics regarding violence against Native women are almost a
mantra now for many of us who work in this area. One in three Native
women will be sexually assaulted in her lifetime, and three out of five will
be victims of domestic violence.89 Major news media outlets have called
the problem "an epidemic."90
88. See, e.g., Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 121 (2004); Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of
Rape Law Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455 (2005); Sarah Deer,
Decolonizing Rape Law: A Native Feminist Synthesis of Safety and Sovereignty, 24 WICAZO
SA REV. 149 (2009); Sarah Deer, Relocation Revisited: Sex Trafficking of Native Women in
the United States, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 621 (2010).
89. See Hilary N. Weaver, The Colonial Context of Violence: Reflections on Violence in
the Lives of Native American Women, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1552, 1557 (2009);
Stephanie Wahab & Lenora Olson, Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Assault in Native
American Communities, 5 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 353 (2004); Policy Insights Brief:
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It is important to understand the origin of those statistics in order to learn
from this data, as opposed to it being a phrase we simply repeat. Many
advocates in tribal communities have told me that those statistics don’t
reflect the reality they encounter. When I talk to advocates on the
reservations and in Alaska Native villages about the "one in three" Native
women, they have expressed skepticism. The skepticism is based on
experience, that the problem is much more significant because the existing
data grossly understates the problem. Charon Asetoyer and other women
from reservations have explained the severity of domestic violence this
way: Native women “talk to their daughters about what to do when they
are sexually assaulted, not if they are sexually assaulted, but when."91 In
2011, Juana Majel Dixon, First Vice President of the National Congress of
American Indians and member of the Pauma-Yuima Band of Luiseno
Indians explained, “Young women on the reservation live their lives in
anticipation of being raped. They talk about ‘how I will survive my rape’
as opposed to not even thinking about it. We shouldn’t have to live our
lives that way.”92 Sexual assault has been normalized in many of our
communities.
In 1999, the Bureau of Justice Statistics issued a report called "American
Indians and Crime," which was really the first national exposure of Native
victimization in the United States.93 It showed a highly disproportionate
Statistics on Violence Against Native Women, NCAI POL’Y RES. CTR. (Feb. 2013),
http://files.ncai.org/broadcasts/2013/February/Policy%20Insights%20Brief_VAWA_020613
.pdf.
90. Suzy Khimm, The Violence Against Women Act Is on Life Support, WASH. POST
(Jan. 25, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/25/
the-violence-against-women-act-is-on-life-support (citing the “epidemic of domestic
violence among Native Americans”); Rebecca Solnit, A Rape a Minute, a Thousand Corpses
a Year, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
rebecca-solnit/violence-against-women_b_2541940.html (“Speaking of epidemics, one of
three Native American women will be raped.”).
91. NATIVE AM. WOMEN’S HEALTH EDUC. RES. CTR., INDIGENOUS WOMEN’S DIALOGUE:
ROUNDTABLE REPORT ON THE ACCESSIBILITY OF P LAN B AS AN OVER THE COUNTER (OTC)
WITHIN INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE 10 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.naho.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/Plan-B-Report.pdf (emphasis added).
92. Kirsten M. Carlson, UN Special Rapporteur Investigates Epidemic of Violence
Against Indian Women in the United States, TURTLE TALK (Jan. 29, 2011, 12:24 PM),
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2011/01/29/un-special-rapporteur-investigates-epidemic-ofviolence-against-indian-women-in-the-united-states/.
93. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=
pbdetail&iid=387. For an updated version, see STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
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level of victimization in the lives of Native people, including data that
Native people have experienced rates of violence at two and one half to
three times higher than the mainstream population. Since 1999, those
statistics have been affirmed, verified, and replicated by a number of
different sources including state and tribal entities.94 Amnesty International
investigated the high rates of sexual violence, which resulted in intense
media attention to the problem.95 What I wanted to speak specifically about
is the data — the one in three data and the three out of five data — and talk
about the challenges with relying on that data.
The first problem we have to confront is that a lot of this data is national
in scope. Using this data to describe problems in all tribal nations is
problematic because each community is different. Tribal governments have
struggled for over a century with the "one size fits all" federal approach to
problem solving in tribal communities. Our tribal communities are often
lumped into a single category (e.g., "Indian Country" or "Native people"),
which does not account for the wide disparity in specific problems faced by
individual sovereign nations.
Most of the time, we don’t have specific data about individual tribal
communities, and of course the crime rates are not the same in every single
community. When the national data does not reflect the reality in a
particular community, there tends to be some skepticism about that data.
The other problem with the national data is that it often does not distinguish
between on-reservation crime and off-reservation crime.

STATISTICS, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002 (2004),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=386.
94. University of Delaware criminologist Ronet Bachman is the leading statistician on
violence against Native women in the United States. See Ronet Bachman et al., Estimating
the Magnitude of Rape and Sexual Assault Against American Indian and Alaska Native
(AIAN) Women, 43 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 199 (2010). Other studies which support
these findings include Shira Rutman et al., Reproductive Health and Sexual Violence Among
Urban American Indian and Alaskan Native Young Women: Select Findings from the
National Survey of Family Growth (2002), 16 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J. S347 (2012);
DANETTE BUSKOVICK & ELIZABETH A. PETERSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: RESULTS FROM THE 2008 MINNESOTA CRIME VICTIM SURVEY (2009), available at
https://www.unitedwaytwincities.org/_asset/fphxh5/2009_Domestic_Violence_Report.pdf;
PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE
PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (2000),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf.
95. AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN
FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA (2007), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/
MazeOfInjustice.pdf.
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In order to understand how to use this information, it is important to
understand how this data is collected and how the numbers are crunched. I
should preface my remarks on data by clarifying that I do not have training
in statistics. However, I think lawyers should have a basic understanding of
how data is collected and published. I apologize for the very cursory
overview that is based on my understanding of how this process works.
Much of this data is collected by the federal government through
victimization surveys.96 Prior to victimization survey development, the
only way to "count" crime was to consider the number of police reports that
were filed. Those of you who are victims or work with victims know that
most of these crimes are never reported to police.97 So relying on law
enforcement report data or prosecution data does not yield accurate results.
The "victim survey" method was developed to contact random samples
of the population (via telephone in most cases) and ask them a series of
questions regarding their experience with crime.98 If a survey respondent
indicates that she has been a victim of crime, she is asked a series of
questions about the type of crime, the race of the perpetrator, and so on.
Victimization surveys are the true origin of much of our knowledge because
most victims don’t officially report crime — especially sexual assault
crimes. Prior to the development of victimization surveys, there was no
way to account for crimes never reported.
Fortunately, the sample sizes in many of these studies have become large
enough that American Indian and Alaska Native data has become
"statistically significant." If the data is not a "statistically significant
sample," then it is simply pooled with other groups of people who do not
constitute a statistically significant sample and categorized as "other." This

96. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Truman & Michael Planty, Criminal Victimization, 2011,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., Oct. 2012, at 1, available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cv11.pdf; LYNN LANGTON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT:
VICTIMIZATIONS NOT REPORTED TO THE POLICE, 2006-2010 (Aug. 2012), available at http://
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vnrp0610.pdf; JANET L. LAURITSEN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, METHODS FOR COUNTING HIGH-FREQUENCY REPEAT VICTIMIZATIONS IN THE
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (2012), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/mchfrv.pdf.
97. See Weaver, supra note 89, at 1556; Victimization Surveys, U. OF ARIZ. RAPE &
SEXUAL ASSAULT SURVEILLANCE PROJECT, http://www.u.arizona.edu/~sexasslt/victimization.
html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
98. See Survey Methodology for Criminal Victimization in the United States, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncvs_methodology.pdf (last visited
Apr. 2, 2013).
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is commonly seen in criminology studies that classify Americans as "White,
Black, and Other."
But it is still important to remember that this data is based on anonymous
surveys using random sample methodology. In at least one series of major
studies, the U.S. Census Bureau is a central player, and statisticians design
these survey projects to ensure scientific validity.99 Since 1999, the data
has been consistent in terms of the very high rate of crimes, particularly in
tribal communities. I am not aware of a single study (federal, state, or
tribal) containing a statistically significant group of American
Indians/Alaska Natives where the data doesn't suggest that Native people
suffer the highest rates of victimization in the United States.
However, one major problem with the data from a federal Indian law
perspective is that the National Crime Victimization Survey (“NCVS”) and
National Violence Against Women Survey (“NVAWS”) studies don't ask
the survey respondent to identify whether a crime occurred on or off
reservation land.100 That piece of information is crucial when trying to
resolve jurisdictional questions and develop solutions to these high rates of
crime.
Another potential weakness of victimization surveys is the likelihood
that a survey respondent may not wish to disclose a crime like sexual
assault, especially if she lives with her abuser. A Native woman may
decline to disclose that she has been victimized because the survey is
sponsored by the federal government, especially if she doesn't trust the
results will be anonymous. Again, these victimization surveys are a vast
improvement over the older way of collecting crime data through reports,
but I think it is fair to say that the numbers may not reflect the true gravity
of the situation.
I'd like to return to my second point — the problem with not knowing
whether these crimes tend to occur in Indian Country.101 Again, the data
simply doesn't tell us. The issue of the race of the perpetrator comes up in
this context because these victimization surveys are telling us that most
perpetrators of violence against Native women are non-Native. Clearly,
Oliphant immediately becomes an issue when you start talking about
99. Data Collection: National Crime Victimization Survey, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
100. Id.; TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 94, at 23.
101. Indian Country is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006), and includes reservations,
dependent Indian communities, and allotments. Tribes only have criminal jurisdiction over
crimes perpetrated by Indians within Indian country. When a crime occurs off-reservation,
even if a tribal member is a defendant, the tribe lacks criminal jurisdiction.
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that.102 One thing is clear: Native women report in these victimization
surveys that most of their perpetrators are non-Native.103 This is an
anomaly in American criminology. Most violent crime in America is intraracial.104 In other words, if you are a white victim, your perpetrator is more
likely than not to be white; if you are a black victim, your perpetrator is
more likely than not to be black. The only exception to that general pattern
is that Native women report their attackers and abusers to be non-Native as
opposed to Native. This is scientifically valid data.
There is skepticism and cynicism in some circles about the interracial
statistics.105 Some of that skepticism might be based on the fact that most
violent crime in the United States is intra-racial. Why would the experience
of Native women be different? And are we letting Native men "off the
hook" by only talking about the non-Native perpetrators?
Frankly, I think the debate is a bit of a distraction, but we have to
confront it because it is driving much of the discussion about an Oliphant
fix, including provisions in the VAWA 2013. From my perspective, even if
only one non-Native man rapes one Native woman on one reservation, that
tribe should be able to assert criminal jurisdiction over that case. So from
that perspective, I don’t see the need to prove that most perpetrators on
reservations are non-Native. Oliphant should be fixed because it was the
wrong decision and is inconsistent with tribal sovereignty.106 For example,
suppose the data showed that only a minority of Native women reported
their attacker/abuser was non-Native. Under those facts, I still think the
102. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that tribes
cannot prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian country).
103. See GREENFELD & SMITH, supra note 93, at 7.
104. See RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA
NATIVE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 38 (2008),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223691.pdf [hereinafter WHAT IS
KNOWN].
105. See Scott Seaborne, Crime Data Misrepresented to Serve Hidden Tribal Agenda,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (June 14, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/
opinion/crime-data-misrepresented-to-serve-hidden-tribal-agenda-118360. But see Carole
Goldberg & Kevin Washburn, Goldberg and Washburn: Lies, Damn Lies, and Crime
Statistics, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (July 25, 2008), http://indiancountrytodaymedia
network.com/node/93310.
106. Many legal scholars and practitioners have explained the flaws in the Oliphant
decision and called for its reversal by Congress. See, e.g., L. Scott Gould, The Consent
Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996); John P.
LaVelle, Petitioner’s Brief — Reargument of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 13 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69 (2003); Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A Constitutional Crisis in Indian
Law?, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 299, 303 (2003-2004).
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Oliphant fix is justified because tribal nations should have authority over all
crimes that happen on their lands. However, studies showing that most
perpetrators of violence against Native women are non-Native are certainly
a compelling reason to fix Oliphant.
In addition to a general skepticism about the percentages of non-Native
perpetrators, there is the community-specific concern. A minority of tribal
nations is so remote or closed that non-Native people are largely absent.
Tribal members in such communities may not see many non-Native people
in their community. So when the data suggests most perpetrators are white,
those tribal members may be understandably skeptical of the data's
accuracy. If the data doesn't reflect the reality in a particular community,
then the data is met with skepticism by members of that community.
And then, of course, we have the urban issue. Some of the critique I
have heard about the racial component of these victimization surveys is that
they actually reflect "urban stats." The argument here is along the lines of,
"these aren’t numbers that are happening on reservations; they are
happening off the reservation," so tribal jurisdiction is not relevant. Tribal
jurisdiction is irrelevant for off-reservation crime, so if the numbers are
more reflective of urban settings, critics say we don’t need to adjust tribal
criminal jurisdiction.
So we really can't say for certain whether most Native women who
experience crime on tribal lands are more likely the victims of Native
people or non-Native people. However, whether the rate is 20% nonNative or 80% non-Native, Congress should correct Oliphant. Future
studies in this area should include this critical data point so we can address
skepticism about the data.107
Here's another interesting facet of the interracial statistic debate. When
someone critiques the data by suggesting that the numbers reflect the reality
in urban settings but not reservation settings, we are still left with a really
problematic situation. If the data is more accurate in the urban settings,
shouldn't we be concerned that most Native women in urban settings are
reporting this high rate of inter-racial crime? Again, remember that most
107. The National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) is authorized “to conduct research on
violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women in Indian Country” pursuant to
the Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act of 2005, Title IX, Section
904(a)(1)(2). Violence Against American Indian and Alaska Native Women: Program of
Research, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/tribal-justice/vawresearch/welcome.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013). The work at NIJ is being informed by
experts and federal stakeholders, although no date has been announced for publishing a
report. Id.
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crime in the United States is intra-racial. Since we know that Native
women are reporting this high rate of inter-racial crime, this suggests there
is a significant problem regardless of tribal jurisdiction.
What factors make it more likely that a Native victim in an urban setting
is more likely than not to be attacked by a non-Native? If Native women
are being targeted for sexual assault, there may very well be a hate-crime
component to some of these crimes. There is a sense that there is a
"rapeability" factor that comes from a product of the United States' long
history of anti-Indian and anti-woman policies, which have become part of
the fabric of our society.108 I think that many advocates would agree with
me that in some predator circles, Native women are perceived as less than
human and therefore they don't deserve protection from the legal system.
This perception becomes enhanced for drug addicted or prostituted women,
and predators may target Native women and girls precisely because they are
marginalized and fall outside the protection of the law.
As lawyers and policy makers, we need a plan of action to fully address
the problem of sexual assault against Native women. In my opinion, there
are three categories of action needed. Some of these efforts are underway,
but much more needs to be done.
The first category is the reform of federal law. Control over violent
crime on reservations should be placed back in the hands of tribal
governments. The Tribal Law and Order Act109 and the VAWA 2013110 are
a good start toward returning and restoring jurisdiction where it belongs —
with tribal governments.
The second category of action is to strengthen the internal capacity of
tribal courts to adjudicate crimes like rape and child sexual abuse. There
are tribes that have been prosecuting these crimes for a long time, but they
are few and far between. As more resources become available and
jurisdiction is restored, more tribal governments will be able to take on
these kinds of crimes. However, one of the problems I have found in my
research is that there are many problematic sex crime laws on some tribal
books. There are sexual assault ordinances at the tribal level that replicate
state law from the 1940s or 1950s, when we had really bad rape laws across
America.
108. See ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN
GENOCIDE (2005) (providing a full discussion of how this dynamic has developed in the
United States).
109. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258.
110. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat.
54.
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Many of these problematic tribal rape laws were adopted in the time of
"boilerplate" or "model tribal codes" — where a law was simply adopted by
a tribal council without modification.111 The Bureau of Indian Affairs
developed a “Model Code for the Administration of Justice by Courts of
Indian Offenses” in the 1970s, which was “nothing more than a redraft of
the old Bureau regulations.”112 These problematic tribal codes are usually
not reflective of traditional tribal values and can make it difficult for a tribal
prosecutor to charge and prosecute crimes against women and children.
For example, I have reviewed tribal sexual assault laws that include
things like spousal exemption, which prevents a tribal prosecutor from
charging a man who rapes his wife. That is an out-dated Anglo-American
law, but still a part of some tribal laws.113 Another example is the problem
of defining sexual assault as requiring physical force instead of a lack of
consent. In some tribal codes, there remains a requirement that the tribal
prosecutor show physical force in order to secure conviction.114 Physical
force is uncommon in cases of sexual assault. Perpetrators generally use
other kinds of force, like coercion and threats.

111. See, e.g., PAWNEE TRIBE OF INDIANS CODE § 234 (“It shall be unlawful to
intentionally, wrongfully, and without consent subject another, not his/her spouse, to any
sexual contact.”); CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE LAW & ORDER CODE § 3-4-18(4) (“[T]he
jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with
special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of
determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private, when
such are not otherwise corroborated.”); SAULT STE. MARIE CODE § 71.1801(4) (“No
prosecution may be instituted or maintained for rape, deviate sexual contact, or sexual
assault unless the alleged offense was brought . . . within thirty (30) days after its
occurrence.”); LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED SALISH & KOOTENAI TRIBES § 2-1-601
(requiring “force” or incapacitation).
112. Russel Lawrence Barsh & J. Youngblood Henderson, Tribal Courts, the Model
Code, and the Police Idea in American Indian Policy, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 26
(1976).
113. See, e.g., MARICOPA AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF ARIZ. CODE § 4.20 (“A person
who commits, or attempts to commit, an act of sexual intercourse with another not his
spouse . . .”); CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE LAW & ORDER CODE § 3-4-18(1) (“code
relating to sexual offenses shall not apply to conduct between married persons”);
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF UMATILLA INDIANS CODE § 85(B) (“‘Female’ means a female
person who is not married to the actor.”) Disclaimer: These tribal codes are provided as
examples and are not intended to blame or embarrass any particular tribal communities.
114. See, e.g., TULALIP TRIBES OF WASH. CODES & REGULATIONS § 3.6.1; FORT PECK
COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE § 220 (1986); CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE LAW AND
ORDER CODE § 3-4-16; CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF UMATILLA INDIANS CODE § 85(C);
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION CODE § 3-1-10.
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Most states have reformed rape law such that lack of consent is sufficient
to prove sexual assault. So tribal laws that include a physical force
requirement are really replicating very antiquated old Anglo-American rape
law. While we are reforming federal law we also have to reform tribal law
so that we can put the control back into the hands of the tribal governments
in a very practical way. If jurisdiction is restored to tribal governments,
tribes must be able to effectively prosecute those crimes, or very little
changes for the lives of victims.
The third category is to pay attention to services for our Native women
living outside the reservation — often in urban areas. For example, most of
the money from the VAWA 2013 is earmarked for tribal governments and
reservation-based advocacy programs. I understand there is not enough
money to go around and all advocacy programs struggle with a lack of
resources. The advocacy programs in tribal communities are absolutely
critical to help secure justice for survivors. However, that money is not
largely available to urban community centers and Native-based advocacy
programs off reservation. Since most Native women don’t live on
reservations,115 we are not fully addressing the problem of violence against
Native women if we don't secure funding and support for off-reservation
programs. In federal Indian law, we are obviously focusing on tribal
jurisdiction (for good reason); but in practice, we are missing a huge
portion of our survivors who don’t live on reservations.
So those are my three recommendations for moving forward to address
violence against Native women: First, continue to reform federal law and
advocate for restoration of tribal authority; second, ensure that tribal
governments have the law and the training in place so that they can take
action in cases of sexual violence; and third, make sure that urban women
are not forgotten. Practitioners and scholars in Indian law should be
cautious when relying on data. We must be cognizant of how the data is
collected and how we use it. Research is a powerful tool for federal Indian
law reform. Mvto (Thank you).
M. Alexander Pearl, NALSA Alum; Assistant Professor, Florida
International University College of Law
It is an honor to be invited to this conference to say a few words about
Indian law, Professor Frickey, and “grounded scholarship.” We are here
today to honor Professor Frickey and remember his call to make legal
115. WHAT IS KNOWN, supra note 104, at 17; TINA NORRIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2010, at 12-13 (2012).
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scholarship relevant for — and grounded in — tribal communities.
Attendees and participants at this conference include tribal advocates,
academics, law students, and practitioners of many different disciplines and
backgrounds. The diversity of people, professions, and perspectives on
tribal communities contribute to Professor Frickey’s suggestion that legal
scholarship provides Native people with a voice, while also moving federal
Indian law and policy.
I would like to bridge the comments made during this conference with
the sentiment expressed by Rovianne Leigh. As Ms. Leigh stated, we are
here today in California where there are more than 100 federally recognized
tribal communities. My goal in bringing focus to California’s Indian
Country, and the criminal justice issues these tribal communities face, is to
highlight the distinct challenges facing these communities.116
It is not obvious that there can be such a monumental difference between
Indian tribes in California and those located in many other states. I came to
law school from Oklahoma, where I was born and raised. As a member of
the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma, I understood Oklahoma tribal
communities. But experiencing Northern California presented me with new
perspectives on the significant diversity of Indian Country. This changed a
lot of my views about what policies are appropriate for individual Native
communities. The differences between Northern California, Southern
California, and the Central Valley are not just geographic. These regions
all contain unique politics, cultures, and norms in both tribal and non-tribal
communities. For example, Oakland is a major urban Indian center
bringing together Indians from all over the country.117 Indeed, Oakland’s
Indian population has a history all its own. The same goes for the histories
of Southern California tribes and those located in rural Northern California.
116. I use the term “Indian Country” to describe generally the areas where tribal
communities are located. It is defined in federal statute as follows:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent,
and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof,
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
117. See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 93-108 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012); SUSAN LOBO, URBAN VOICES: THE BAY AREA
AMERICAN INDIAN COMMUNITY (2002).
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One thing common to all California tribal communities, however, is
Public Law 280.118 Prior to 1953, the longstanding general rule was that
state law, including criminal law, did not apply in Indian Country.119 For
centuries, tribal governments were the only entities with criminal
jurisdiction in Indian Country.120 In 1883, the Supreme Court in Ex parte
Kan-Gi-Shun-Ka (Ex parte Crow Dog) confirmed that a crime committed
by an Indian against another Indian did not give rise to federal
jurisdiction.121 In response, Congress passed the Major Crimes Act,
granting federal authorities the power to investigate, enforce, and prosecute
certain crimes occurring in Indian Country.122 The federal statutes creating
federal jurisdiction did not preclude tribal jurisdiction, but states lacked
jurisdictional authority.123 This all changed in 1953 with the enactment of
Public Law 280. Affecting only five mandatory states, including
California, Public Law 280 precluded federal jurisdiction and conferred
jurisdictional authority on the state government to enforce and prosecute
crimes occurring in Indian Country, thereby flipping the general rules
regarding criminal jurisdiction.
Most people familiar with Indian law and Native people understand why
Public Law 280 was — and remains — wildly unpopular in tribal
communities. States and tribes have long clashed with one another.124 The
Supreme Court has even recognized they are often the “deadliest
enemies.”125 To be fair, states were not necessarily thrilled about Public

118. Pub. L. No. 83-280 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006), 25
U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (2006), & 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)).
119. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
120. See generally Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ka, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); Kevin K. Washburn,
Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779 (2006).
121. Kan-Gi-Shun-Ka, 109 U.S. at 570-72.
122. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1153, 3242 (2006)); Washburn, supra note 120, at 803-05; see also Robert N.
Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
113 (2002).
123. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329 (1978); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S.
193, 207 (2004).
124. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of TribalState Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73, 73-87 (2007); Ezra Rosser, Caution, Cooperative
Agreements, and the Actual State of Things: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 42 TULSA L.
REV. 57 (2006).
125. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“[Indian tribes] owe no
allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling,
the people of the states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies.”).
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Law 280 either, since it did not simultaneously increase funding
commensurate with the newly obtained enforcement authority and caseload.
After nearly sixty years, Congress finally amended Public Law 280.126
In the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (“TLOA”), Congress allowed
Indian tribes located in mandatory Public Law 280 states to request the
Department of Justice to re-assert criminal jurisdiction.127 If the federal
government accepts jurisdiction, the result would be tri-partite jurisdiction,
shared among federal, state, and tribal governments. This is perhaps a step
in the right direction, as an attempt to level the playing field across Indian
Country by providing tribal governments in California with similar
opportunities for protecting their communities as those living in South
Dakota and other states not subject to Public Law 280. The law potentially
re-establishes the federal-tribal law enforcement relationship for California
tribes, whereas tribes in non-Public Law 280 states have not been denied
the involvement of federal law enforcement and prosecution.
However, there is much more to Public Law 280 and its long-running
consequences in California than the simple question of which government
has the authority to enforce and prosecute crimes. There are over 100
federally recognized Indian tribes in California and only a small percentage
have comprehensive courts and police forces. This is a dramatic difference
compared to tribes in non-Public Law 280 states.128 Why the great
distinction? It is difficult to say, and is more complex than this brief essay
can summarize, but Public Law 280 has played a role. State governments
were allowed to enforce what essentially are foreign laws upon tribal
communities with very different values, norms, and cultures. As a result,
independent tribal justice systems from these communities have not had the
space to emerge and mature. Even though Public Law 280 did not
affirmatively preclude tribes from exercising criminal jurisdiction, the
overlay of a foreign legal regime impacted the ability of tribal communities

126. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006). Congress passed amendments to Public Law 280 in 1968.
The amendments required tribal consent in order to transfer jurisdiction from the federal
government to the state government. No tribe ever consented to a transfer after the passage
of this amendment.
127. Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 221, 124 Stat. 2258, 2271.
128. CAROLE GOLDBERG & DUANE CHAMPAGNE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT:
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER PUBLIC LAW 280 (2008), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222585.pdf; STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF TRIBAL JUSTICE AGENCIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY, 2002, at 3
(2005), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ctjaic02.pdf (out of the eighty-eight
California tribes that participated in the census, seventy-four relied on state courts).
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to engage in self-determination and cultural expression through creating
legal regimes.
Regardless of why California Indian tribes have fewer formal criminal
justice systems it is important to understand the need for a community to
have comprehensive and well-functioning criminal justice systems. There
is great emphasis, well-deserved, on the importance of addressing the
epidemic of violence and sexual assault against Native women.129 The
statistics on that issue are simply astounding.130 It is not difficult to
imagine that adequately addressing this problem in California will require a
different solution than those implemented in non-Public Law 280 states.
As an example, there are provisions in the TLOA, as well as the recently
passed reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA
2013”), that provide tribal courts with jurisdictional authority to arrest, try,
and punish non-Indian offenders.131 While this is a laudable provision with
the appropriate policy in mind, it does little to help most of California
Indian tribes, which lack comprehensive courts and law enforcement. The
expansion of jurisdictional authority for a tribal court does no good to an
Indian tribe lacking a justice system. Even with these national policy
changes in the TLOA, many of the pressing issues for California Indian
tribes will persist because the solutions are not tailored for the
circumstances of these communities.
Another point often absent from the congressional discussion about
criminal issues in Indian Country concerns tribal choices to adopt formal
western-style court systems or to use tribal customary law based systems.
Many tribes successfully employ both.132 This is a fundamental aspect of

129. See AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS
WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA (2006), available at http://www.amnesty
usa.org/pdfs/MazeOfInjustice.pdf.
130. Statistics show that one in three Native women will be raped in her lifetime.
TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 94, at 22; see also Native Women: Protecting, Shielding,
and Safeguarding Our Sisters, Mothers, and Daughters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Sarah Deer, Assistant Professor, William
Mitchell College of Law).
123. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904,
127 Stat. 54, 120-23.
132. See, e.g., The Peacemaking Program of the Navajo Nation, NAVAJO NATION, http://
www.navajocourts.org/indexpeacemaking.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2013); Peacemaking
Court, CHICKASAW NATION JUD. DEP’T, http://www.chickasaw.net/Judicial-Department/
Courts/Peacemaking-Court.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2013); James W. Zion, The Navajo
Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and Accommodation to the New, 11 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 89 (1983).
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self-determination and directly bears on that which a criminal justice
system is intended to do — express the morality of the community.133 At a
basic level, tribal communities must be able to adequately protect
themselves and their members. The method by which this is done should
come from within the tribe rather than from the outside.
This is a fundamental criticism of Public Law 280. It was an external
law forced upon certain Indian tribes that required an outside entity to apply
foreign law to communities with very different cultural practices. While
the TLOA’s potential for bringing the federal government back into the fold
is an improvement for tribes in mandatory Public Law 280 states, such a
policy does not recognize the unique challenges facing California Indian
Country given their unique history with Public Law 280. Simply reestablishing the federal-tribal relationship for California tribes fails to
address the need for comprehensive and culturally relevant tribal justice
systems arising from within the community. In sum, it fails to address the
principle of self-determination — that Indian tribes have the ability to
create solutions that work best for their own community.
My hope is that the discussion on criminal jurisdictional issues starts to
recognize the unique position of California Indian tribes. One possible way
to draw attention to this is by working with California tribal communities.
That is what this conference is about and why there are people other than
legal academics contributing to this discussion. Learning and writing about
tribal communities gives those “discrete and insular minorities” a voice and
broadens the academic perspective.134
This is part of what Professor Frickey identified as lacking in legal
scholarship. Talking about the law in a vacuum does not assist Native
people, and it provides little rationale for why a change in law or policy
would be warranted. It would be remarkable to go and work with tribal
communities and assist in identifying problems, characteristics, and
solutions specific to them. The potential benefit may well extend to Indian
Country generally by adding to the public knowledge about how tribal
communities operate and what needs are most pressing.
Unfortunately, we know so little about many aspects of the criminal
issues in Public Law 280 in Indian Country. Professor Carol Goldberg at
UCLA has lead the charge by collecting important empirical information
133. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV.
777, 782-83 (2006) (“Criminal law is the formal legal institution in which communities
express important collective decisions as to what is right and what is wrong within their
communities.”).
134. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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about Public Law 280 tribal communities.135 But she is one of the few
people doing this type of work. It would be fascinating to do a case study
working with a California tribal community that is interested in better
understanding the kinds of issues that it is encountering. Proceeding in this
manner creates an opportunity for grounded scholarship to drive policy
choices that ultimately empower tribal communities.
BERKELEY LAW’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR HEEDING FRICKEY’S CALL
Matthew Fletcher, Professor of Law and Director of the Indigenous Law &
Policy Center, Michigan State University College of Law
The good thing about this conference is how Berkeley is taking Indian
law and Indian Country seriously. I remember when I wrote my paper
about the Supreme Court’s certiorari process and its effects on tribal
petitions, I wanted to hear what former Supreme Court clerks would say
about my theory, and whether they thought it was very important.136 I was
writing about what is known as a “cert pool.” Some of the justices were in
the cert pool and some were not, but I was critiquing the cert pool. The
former clerks who were working for justices in the cert pool hated my
paper, and the ones who were not in the cert pool, which included Professor
Frickey, thought it was a pretty good paper. But one professor, who was a
Supreme Court clerk, said to me, just after spending a good deal of time
being critical of my conclusions, (and I’m paraphrasing) that the paper
reminded her of how the reality of being a student clerk is that you get a lot
of “dogs.” She referred to “dogs” as what clerks called cases they don’t
like, such as tax cases, bankruptcy cases, probate cases, and Indian cases.137
The clerks don’t want to work on those.
When they get an Indian case, an Indian cert petition, or a prisoner cert
petition — a prisoner habeas case — they don’t pay much attention to them.
They give them the barest amount of interest, unless the prisoner or the
Indians have won in the lower court, and I’m quoting now, “Because that’s
not supposed to happen.” The great thing about having Berkeley, an
institution that frankly people like the Supreme Court will listen to, hold
this conference is to help alleviate the disconnect — that we see on the
Court, in the federal courts, the state courts, and maybe sometimes in the
135. GOLDBERG & CHAMPAGNE, supra note 128.
136. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as
Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2009).
137. E.g., JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH: THE OBAMA WHITE HOUSE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 54 (2012).
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tribal courts. But what we have heard today is what is going in Indian
Country, so there are my two cents.
Katherine Florey, Professor of Law, University of California at Davis
My name is Katherine Florey. I am a Professor of Law at University of
California (“UC”) Davis. I am also a Berkeley Law graduate and a student
of Phil Frickey’s. I can certainly say that I would not have the Indian law
specialty that I do now as an academic if it were not for taking Phil
Frickey’s class, and I want to do everything I can to ensure that future
Berkeley law students have the same opportunities.
I absolutely agree with everything that you have said from your
perspective as students. I wanted to add a slightly different perspective as a
professor at UC Davis, a program that has only recently demonstrated a
commitment to Indian law. I know it is difficult for us at UC Davis to
recruit Native students, and we too, like Berkeley, lose a lot of students to
Colorado, Arizona, and Arizona State universities. But I think the lack of
an Indian law program at Berkeley also really hurts the profession and hurts
the representation of Native American interests in the judicial branch and
elsewhere. If you look at the kind of schools that produce a lot of clerks on
circuits like the Ninth, that are dealing with a lot of Indian law issues, it is
extremely important that the students who get those kinds of positions be
exposed to Indian law and Native issues. The document that the Native
American Law Student Association (“NALSA”) put together shows that
Berkeley’s program falls short compared to those at University of
Washington, UCLA, and a number of other schools.
But I think it is also an important point that Indian law is appallingly
under-taught in schools that produce a lot of clerks. Looking at the
negative judicial decisions that have occurred in the past few decades, I
think one driving force has been that judges are not necessarily informed
about these issues, and their clerks are not necessarily informed about these
issues. So it is really important, not only from the standpoint of attracting
and retaining students at Berkeley, but also in marrying the interests of
students who want to learn about this topic with the resources of Berkeley
and its ability to place clerks, for students with Indian law knowledge to
have better representation in the judiciary.
I did a little research yesterday and looked at other law schools that are
in the same tier as Berkeley — that is, schools historically in the top ten that
produce a lot of Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court clerks. This academic
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year, Berkeley is not alone in not offering a basic Indian law class.138 In
fact, from what I could find from this academic year, only Columbia,
University of Pennsylvania, Harvard, and Yale appear to be teaching
regular survey Indian law classes.139 There are no Indian law classes offered
this year at Michigan, Virginia, or Stanford universities.140 New York
University has a one-credit class in taxation issues, so that is the only way
Indian law makes its way into the curriculum.141 And again, this is just not
enough in terms of what law schools need to do to educate the people who
are going to be clerks and going to communicate Indian law issues to the
wider judicial community. So I think that is another important dimension
of the problem.
From the perspective of someone else who teaches at a UC, we have a
very strong Native American Studies undergraduate program, and many of
the students in that program are Native students from California. A lot of
them feel that if they want to go to law school, they have to go out of
state.142 I think that is very unfortunate. It is great that other law schools are
offering high-quality programs;143 but there are some specifically
138. This information is based on my search of publicly available course listings at the
schools mentioned. In all cases, I searched on the terms “Native,” “Indian,” and “tribal” to
determine what courses were being offered.
139. The online catalogs I searched to obtain this information are accessible at Browse,
COLUMBIA LAW SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/courses/browse (last visited Apr. 17,
2013); Course Registration for Upper-Level Law Students, PENN LAW: UNIV. OF PA. LAW
SCH., https://www.law.upenn.edu/registrar/2l-3l-and-llm.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2013);
Search for Courses, YALE LAW SCH., http://ylsinfo.law.yale.edu/wsw/prereg/CourseGrid
Params.asp (last visited Apr. 17, 2013); and Course Catalog, HARVARD LAW SCH., http://
www.law.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
140. Online catalogs for these institutions are at Office of Student Records, MICH. LAW:
UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/currentstudents/registration/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2013); Current Courses, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW,
http://lawnotes2.law.virginia.edu/lawweb/course.nsf/CbTbN (last visited Apr. 17, 2013); and
Office of the Registrar, STANFORD LAW SCH., http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/
offices/office-of-the-registrar/stanford-law-class-schedule-grids (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
141. See NYU’s online course listing at Course Descriptions, NYU LAW,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/courses/index.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
142. I do not have precise statistics on the percentage of Native American undergraduates
at UC Davis at who leave California to attend law school, but the issue has frequently arisen
in my conversations with members of the Native American Studies department as well as
with law students who have mentioned the limited nature of UC Davis’s Indian law offerings
as a reason why they almost chose another law school.
143. Only twenty-four law schools across the nation offer Indian law programs or clinics.
Some of those include Arizona, Arizona State, Colorado, Minnesota, University of
Oklahoma, and Washington. See Law Schools Offering Native Law Programs, TURTLE
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Californian issues,144 and people who have ties with California and the
California tribes should have some opportunity to stay close to home if they
want. I absolutely agree that as part of the public law system and as a
historically strong public law school with a commitment to the public
interest, offering a strong Indian law program is really something Berkeley
needs to do.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIAN COUNTRY
Joseph Bryan, Assistant Professor of Geography, University of Colorado at
Boulder
Even though I received my Ph.D. in Geography at UC Berkeley across
the campus from where Phil Frickey taught at Boalt Law School, I only had
a vague understanding of who he was. So when I was first invited to attend
this conference, “Heeding Frickey’s Call: Doing Justice in Indian Country,”
I had to first find out who Frickey was so I could hear his call and try to
answer it. In a short crash course of reading Frickey’s work, I gleaned a
few things that I wanted to engage with my remarks.145 First and foremost,
it’s clear that Phil Frickey was well aware of the eloquent and sophisticated
legal rationale behind federal Indian law. Those qualities formed a central
problem that he engaged with time and again, namely that Indian law, for
all its eloquence and sophistication, risked obscuring a meaningful
understanding of what Indian peoples’ lives are actually like.146 The more
TALK, http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/law-schools-offering-indian-law-progra
ms.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). The only law school among the five University of
California law schools to offer such a program is UCLA. See id.
144. For example, numerous California ballot propositions, such as California
Proposition 5, the Tribal-State Gaming Compacts Initiative (1998), affect the negotiation
process for gaming compacts between California tribes and the state.
145. My reading of Frickey’s work here is by no means comprehensive. In the spirit of
the conference at which it was presented, my intention instead was to use it as prompt for
reflection on future directions in scholarship and advocacy regarding indigenous peoples.
For a more thorough discussion of Frickey’s work, see Tribute Issue in Honor of Philip P.
Frickey, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1101 (2010); see also Sarah Krakoff, The Last Indian Raid in
Kansas: Context, Colonialism, and Philip P. Frickey's Contributions to American Indian
Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1253 (2010).
146. In Frickey’s own words:
I suggest that future Indian law scholarship should be less formalistic and
doctrinal-less treatise-like-and more sensitive to Cohen's brand of legal realism.
In my judgment, this kind of scholarship in federal Indian law should be
simultaneously more grounded and more theoretical. If doctrine is at least as
subject to evolution here as in other fields of law, scholarship should aspire to
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developed federal Indian law became, the further it drifted from actually
administering justice to the people who it was supposed to protect. That
problem was striking to me, resonating with my own work on the role of
mapping indigenous land claims, which I will explain in a moment.
It also leads to a second and related point evinced by Frickey’s work,
regarding how federal Indian law does not always exist in direct
relationship to Indians’ everyday lives. As such, the legal recognition of
rights risks silencing actual Indian voices, further excluding Indian people
from society through their inclusion within the legal system.147 A third
point I gleaned from Frickey’s work regards the law and its relationship to
colonialism. Frickey offered a compelling view when he noted that federal
Indian law amounts to a means of governing colonialism rather than doing
away with it altogether.148
Taken collectively, these three points underscore Frickey’s concern with
justice. It was not a doctrinal vision of justice as the law applied. Instead it
was a more deliberative, evolving sense of justice meant to prompt a
discussion about what we, as people joined together by a commitment to do

explain and prescribe Indian law where, according to Cohen, it counts-on the
ground. What actually happens on Indian reservations concerning the creation,
evolution, and implementation of law is a subject about which the broader legal
community has few conceptions, and most of those are probably inaccurate. If,
as legal realism suggests, the law that counts is the law in action, and the law in
action should be measured by a bottom-up consequential calculus rather than
some top-down consistency with abstract doctrine, the legal community cannot
hope to understand, much less appreciate, federal Indian law without a much
better sense of grounded reality.
Frickey, Transcending, supra note 1, at 650.
147. As Frickey stated:
Virtually all the writing by law professors and, so far as I can tell, mostly by
other academics as well, that might have relevance to tribal institutions and law
has involved abstract discussions of judicial decisions, the refinement of
adversarial arguments about the meaning of tribal sovereignty, the trust
relationship between the federal government and tribes, and so on. Now, there
is nothing wrong with this, it is all well and good and contributes to a better
understanding of ideas in the area. But the work has not grappled with the law
on the ground in Indian country, as mediated through tribal institutions. There
is a virtual void of information on this score in the scholarly literature. Is it any
wonder that federal judges do not stop to second-guess their instinctive
suspicions about such matters?
Frickey, Address, supra note 3, at 28; see also Frickey, Transcending, supra note 1.
148. Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 431, 434 (2005).
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justice for indigenous peoples, might do collectively in the future. My
remarks are thus intended as a contribution to that debate.
Since the 1990s, my research has focused largely on the application of
international human rights standards for indigenous peoples, rather than the
federal Indian law that figured prominently in Frickey’s work.
Nonetheless, I think international human rights law faces many of the same
problems Frickey identified in federal Indian law. In particular, if you read
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples or the
International Labor Organization’s Convention 169 (“ILO 169”), or even
the draft text of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, it’s not hard to miss how they conjure a general idea of indigenous
peoples as a subject of international law through the enumeration of the
rights they are said to possess.
Much as Frickey noted with regard to United States federal Indian law,
international human rights standards describe a particular kind of
individual. That individual is one whose rights are at once a function of his
or her membership in an indigenous group and as a potential citizenship in
a state. There is good reason for this characterization. One of the founding
points raised by the discourse of indigenous rights has been to call attention
to indigenous peoples’ chronic condition of statelessness. The legal framing
of that problem proposes a remedy, namely that through legal recognition
of rights indigenous peoples can be included within state societies, often as
citizens. This point is an extremely important one, a result of decades of
advocacy work by indigenous peoples aimed at bringing a notion of
collective rights into the present.
And yet, in spite of that effort, it is worth pointing out that much like
federal Indian law, international indigenous rights continues to rely on state
recognition as a key condition for being able to exercise those collective
rights. In that dynamic, a familiar problem comes into view, making the
exercise of rights contingent upon their recognition and guarantee by a
sovereign state.149 Indigenous peoples’ chronic statelessness compounds
this problem, since it is the outcome of historical displacement and
dispossession.150 Remedying that condition thus requires more than a
149. This problem has persistently haunted human rights, a point articulately set forth in
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (2d ed. 1958).
150. In the U.S. context, Frickey openly asked,
How might one figure out what powers tribes have lost by virtue of their
dependent status? The Court has never seriously considered this a historical
test. Indeed, how would it figure out at what point in time a particular tribe lost
a particular power that had, by hypothesis, never been taken away by treaty or
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doctrinal or formal legal recognition of rights. It raises a fundamental
question: can states protect the very people that they historically excluded
from their society? The point might seem overly philosophical or
“academic;” but it is worth pointing out that it defies a simple yes or no
answer.151
By way of elaborating and grounding that point, let me now turn to my
own work. Since 2001, much of my work has focused on efforts to
implement the Inter-American Court of Human Right’s ruling in the case of
Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua. Many of you are likely aware that in 2001, the
indigenous Mayangna community of Awas Tingni won a landmark legal
ruling from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.152 The Court is a
part of the Inter-American System that includes the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, and its ruling holds broad significance for
indigenous rights in the Americas. In its ruling, the Court affirmed that
Awas Tingni has a collective right to property established by their
customary use and occupancy of land and resources. The Court’s ruling
illustrates the trend in international law for using property to recognize a
broad range of rights claimed by indigenous peoples.153
In the Awas Tingni case, the Inter-American Court equated the concept
of property with the concept of territory elaborated in international
indigenous rights law.154 Arguments made by lawyers representing Awas

statute, but instead by the unwritten, mystical evolution of the relationship
between the United States and this tribe (or all tribes), as seen through the eyes
of non-Indian judges?
Frickey, Transcending, supra note 1, at 659. Answering that question was thus much more
than simply a matter of demystification through simple historicism. Instead, Frickey implied
that it created the basis for an entirely new approach to the importance of the law. Id.
151. I take heed of Frickey’s injunction that “scholarship in federal Indian law should be
simultaneously more grounded and more theoretical.” Id. at 650-51.
152. S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A
New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 1
(2002).
153. S. James Anaya, Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous
Peoples, and Rights over Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist Trend, 16 COLO.
J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 237, 238-39 (2005); see also S. James Anaya & Robert A.
Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights over Lands and Natural
Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33
(2001).
154. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295,
art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/
documents/DRIPS_en.pdf; International Labour Organisation [ILO], Convention No. 169
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Tingni facilitated the Court’s interpretation, rendering territory as property
and thus making it something that states could recognize. The shift in
emphasis was more than a matter of semantics. It minimized the perceived
threat that indigenous territorial claims posed to state sovereignty while
underscoring the fundamental importance of control over land and
resources. Maps made by the community were key to this process. The
maps were made in close adherence with the legal definition of territory
found in documents like ILO 169, while at the same time demonstrating the
feasibility of recognizing the community’s claim in terms of bounded
notions of property.155
In spite of the community’s legal success, it took seven years — until
December 2008 — for the Nicaraguan government to comply with the
Inter-American Court’s ruling and issue Awas Tingni a title. What
happened in those seven years warrants scrutiny. As I just mentioned, the
legal content of the Inter-American Court’s decision made an important,
progressive statement about the basis for recognizing indigenous peoples’
land and resource rights. But the Court also deferred the duty to determine
the specific extent and location of those rights to the government of
Nicaragua. The move was a predictable but intriguing one, especially if
you read the transcripts of the proceedings before the Inter-American
Court.156 As many of you know, the community’s lawyer and current UN
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, arts. 13-14, Jun. 27,
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991).
155. S. James Anaya & Theodore Macdonald, Demarcating Indigenous Territories in
Nicaragua: The Case of Awas Tingni, 19 CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q. 69 (1995), available at
http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/nicaragua/demarcat
ing-indigenous-territories-nicaragua-case; see also Joel Wainwright & Joe Bryan,
Cartography, Territory, Property: Postcolonial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-mapping
in Nicaragua and Belize, 16 CULTURAL GEOGRAPHIES 153 (2009) [hereinafter Wainwright &
Bryan, Cartography].
156. In their presentations before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Nicaraguan
officials repeatedly demonstrated their utter lack of knowledge of the area where Awas
Tingni is located beyond their insistence that the land in question belonged to the state. The
following exchange between Awas Tingni witness Jaime Castillo Felipe and the
Government of Nicaragua’s lawyer is revealing of this dynamic:
Government of Nicaragua (GON): Yes, Sir. Mr. Castillo, could you tell us
what distance you normally cover to hunt and fish?
Witness Jaime Castillo Felipe (through interpreter): In all the area over
which we have the run of the land, we make use of different activities, without
other options to work them there.
GON: Excuse me, what distance do you cover to hunt, to fish?
Witness Jaime Castillo Felipe: He does not specify the distances, but rather
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Special Reporter on Indigenous Rights, S. James Anaya, made a series of
brilliant arguments about state definitions of property. In particular, he
drew attention to how Nicaragua had used the indeterminacy and
arbitrariness of its definition of property to justify racialized dispossession,
not just of Awas Tingni residents, but of indigenous peoples in general by
claiming “empty” lands for the state. That indeterminacy also presented an
opportunity for recognizing indigenous peoples’ own definitions of
property as a matter of basic human rights. During the implementation of
the Awas Tingni ruling, state officials flipped Anaya’s argument back at the
community, effectively accusing the community of arbitrarily delimiting its
claim. While state officials nominally recognized the Court’s ruling, they
insisted on verifying Awas Tingni’s claims. What’s more, they effectively
tasked Awas Tingni with proving that state recognition of the community’s
right to property would not disrupt other groups’ use and occupancy rights.
The state’s position created a whole range of problems that figured
prominently in the seven-year delay between the ruling and the actual
transfer of title. In particular, the claim boundaries mapped by Awas
Tingni were contested — at times violently — by neighboring indigenous
Miskito communities. These Miskito communities contested the boundaries
that were drawn on the map, saying that the Mayangna residents of Awas
Tingni had taken land from them and created significant ethnic tensions.
Thus, in spite of a long history of shared inhabitation of this space, titling
Awas Tingni’s claim required splitting the area into bounded claims,
stoking fears of an ethnic conflict between groups that might otherwise be
considered equally indigenous. At the same time, the conflict over
boundaries also obscured the very different historical and cultural bases for
the communities’ respective claims.
Without going into a long and drawn out explanation of how those
arguments worked, suffice it to say that the Miskito have historically been
much more politically powerful in eastern Nicaragua than the Mayangna.
That inequality was reinforced by the Miskito-dominated regional
government’s efforts to adjudicate the overlap between the communities’
he takes all the area which belongs to him, so he is not interested right now in
saying from here to there.
GON: Really, the State of Nicaragua is interested in knowing that distance.
Witness Jaime Castillo Felipe: In this case it is the government’s obligation
to go and recognize or know the terrain and not be asking the length without
seeing things.
Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Community of Awas Tingni: Transcript of the Public Hearing
on the Merits, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 139 (2002).
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claims. That process cut Awas Tingni’s claim roughly in half before the
state even began to survey the area for title. It also created a great deal of
uncertainty at the community level over who was getting what rights to
what land. In response, many young men took to preemptively logging in
the overlapping areas, often aided and abetted by unscrupulous logging
agents and regional politicians with a hand in the region’s quasi-legal
logging trade. As a result, when Awas Tingni finally received their title in
2008, half of their land claim had already been taken away or ceded to other
communities, the forest had been depleted, and they faced serious tensions
with many of their Miskito neighbors.
Those problems, however, were only rarely linked to the Inter-American
Court’s ruling. Instead they were repeatedly blamed on the general levels
of political dysfunction and corruption found in Nicaragua.
The
characterization of these problems as domestic or regional ones allowed the
international status of the Awas Tingni ruling to stand. They also
reproduced a familiar division between the universal rationale of
international human rights and the messy reality of domestic politics. That
distinction was reinforced by Anaya’s celebratory account of the 2008
titling ceremony in Awas Tingni that was published in the Indian Country
Today, heralding the event as a milestone in international indigenous
rights.157
Anaya’s claim about the international significance of Awas Tingni’s
victory was not inaccurate. It did, however, fail to grapple with the
complexity of events on the ground. In January 2009, one month after the
titling ceremony, I went to Awas Tingni to hear for myself what community
residents thought of the affair. I had no way of anticipating the political
obstacles I was about to encounter. To get to the community I had to
navigate a series of road blockades mounted by neighboring Miskito
communities barring access to Awas Tingni. The Miskito language radio
stations in the region crackled with threats to kidnap the leaders of Awas
Tingni, holding them ransom in exchange for the community’s title.
Neighboring communities further threatened to rip up and destroy Awas
Tingni’s title, insisting that the Nicaraguan government to title their lands
first before addressing Awas Tingni’s claim.
Fortunately for me, I was able to wait several days until the blockades
were temporarily lifted in order to allow political parties to campaign in the
157. S. James Anaya, Anaya: Nicaragua's Titling of Communal Lands Marks Major Step
for Indigenous Rights, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Jan. 5, 2009), http://indiancountrytoday
medianetwork.com/ictarchives/2009/01/05/anaya-nicaragua%25e2%2580%2599s-titling-ofcommunal-lands-marks-major-step-for-indigenous-rights-83485.
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communities in advance of the upcoming regional elections. When I
arrived in Awas Tingni, people were genuinely shocked to see me. Once
they finished asking me how I got there, they began to tell me about the
events that transpired in the month following the award of their title. In
particular, they spoke of how they felt like they had won their case and
obtained a title only to feel “jailed” (encarcelado) in the community by the
ensuing blockades and threats.
So what went wrong? I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about that
question since 2009, and I am still working out my analysis on that. But
there are a few things we can rule out. The problems of the Awas Tingni
case were hardly caused by bad lawyers. To the contrary, Awas Tingni had
one of the best lawyers in the business working for them. Nor could the
problems be attributed to an error in the Inter-American Court’s ruling —
though I would raise the question of whether or not we really want to
equate territory with property.158 Was it because of a bad map? Yes and
no. The map was made according to the best abilities of the people
working on it at the time, but the ensuing boundary conflicts should be used
to rethink how we go about making and using these kinds of maps in future
land claims.
The problems associated with implementation of the Awas Tingni case
raise a number of deeper questions that resonate with those raised in
Frickey’s work. Most prominently, the problems of implementation affirm
the persistence of institutionalized racism in spite of legal recognition of
rights. That challenge is one faced daily by residents of Awas Tingni in
spite of their international legal success. This point was brought home to
me on that visit in 2009 when one of my long-time friends in the
community said, “We have a title now, but we no longer have a territory.”
Put differently, the community had legal recognition of its rights but lacked
the political space in which to exercise them.
Now it is easy to sit here in the United States and say that the problems
residents of Awas Tingni face are not questions of international law but
rather of disrespect for the rule of law. In short, they are “domestic”
problems chronically found in postcolonial settings where states simply fail
to apply the law. Both Miskito opposition to Awas Tingni’s title and the
Nicaraguan government’s delay in implementation demonstrate just how

158. Joe Bryan, Rethinking Territory: Social Justice and Neoliberalism in Latin
America’s Territorial Turn, 6 GEOGRAPHY COMPASS 215 (2012); see also Wainwright &
Bryan, Cartography, supra note 155.
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much ongoing forms of colonialism shape legal recognition of indigenous
rights.
Nor are the problems of implementation a matter of “external”
international law freed from colonialism contrasting with ongoing forms of
“internal” colonialism practiced in countries. As Frickey’s point about the
role of the law in governing colonialism makes clear, the connections are
much more complex. Here, Frickey’s work suggests the importance of deemphasizing a “formalistic” or “doctrinal” reading of the law in order to
take stock of how indigenous peoples envision their rights and the exercise
of those rights.159 That does not mean abandoning or turning away from the
law, much less the concept of rights. Instead, it underscores that while
there is a law to denounce injustice and inequality, in the law itself there is
no justice.160 That point has been raised by many people, and it is
important to heed their call. But the real purpose of that statement is to turn
our attention elsewhere, toward a consideration of the social basis for rights
themselves.
Thinking about how rights are exercised and enjoyed requires setting
aside the law for a moment in order to recognize that indigenous peoples
and Indians alike cannot ultimately rely on states for protection and
guarantee of their rights. They have to rely on other people. To enjoy
rights in any meaningful sense requires having others who recognize them
and guarantee them in exchange for the same. In short, we are dependent
on others to enjoy our rights.161 This point is deceptively simple and yet
essential to recognize. It deemphasizes the central importance of state
sovereignty as necessary to guaranteeing rights. Instead, it shifts attention
to creating the kinds of social relationships that will allow for the practice
of more meaningful forms of self-determination.162 Awas Tingni’s
experience underscores the importance of that task.
159. Frickey, Transcending, supra note 1, at 650. This point is insightfully elaborated
through Sarah Krakoff’s arguments with regard to the distinct, “experiential” meaning of
“sovereignty” for members of the Navajo Nation. Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of
Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV.
1109, 1114 (2004). For an alternative engagement with a similar notion, see ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND
PEACE, 1600-1800 (1999).
160. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 11
CARDOZO L. REV. 919 (1990) (translated by Mary Quaintance).
161. JUDITH BUTLER, PARTING WAYS: JEWISHNESS AND THE CRITIQUE OF ZIONISM (2012).
162. For a more concrete discussion of what this might look like, see generally Joe
Bryan, Walking the Line: Participatory Mapping, Indigenous Rights, and Neoliberalism, 42
GEOFORUM 40 (2011). For a thorough and distinct, yet not unrelated, discussion of the
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But my sense of the importance of that task is scarcely limited to my
experiences with Awas Tingni. Instead it resonates across the string of
experiences I’ve had working on indigenous rights with regard to oil
development in Ecuador, conservation and land loss in Alaska, land claims
brought by the Mapuche in Chile, the politics of federal recognition of
tribes in California, and, most recently, from my time with Zapotec
communities in Oaxaca, who refuse the idea of private property altogether.
As I hear it, heeding Frickey’s call means using those claims and struggles
to think through the prospects for justice, listening to indigenous peoples’
own assessments of that process. This is certainly what I have tried to do in
Awas Tingni, but the task is broader than that. It involves a broader
conversation among indigenous peoples. Briefly put, I would wager that a
part of that task requires moving away from the emphasis on the legal
recognition of specific rights and toward using the law to create and
maintain the spaces and relationships necessary for the enjoyment of rights
that I have proposed here. In that task lies the hope for creating
possibilities for self-determination in terms that work for people,
indigenous and otherwise.
Amy Bowers Cordalis, Staff Attorney, Native American Rights Fund
It is great to be back at Boalt Hall. Thank you for the invitation to speak
at this conference. I am an attorney at the Native American Rights Fund
(“NARF”) and a member of the Yurok Tribe of Northern California. I
appreciate the comments made today regarding California Indians. It makes
me feel good and warms my heart to know that people are thinking of us.
Today I am going to talk about implementation of the United Nations
(“UN”) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (“Declaration”) in
the United States.163 NARF has represented the National Congress of
American Indians in the negotiation of the Declaration since 1999. The
Declaration was adopted by the UN in September of 2007 and was
endorsed by the United States in December of 2010.164 The Declaration
confirms “the collective rights of Indigenous Peoples as human rights” and
rights to self-determination, religion, education, land and resources, and
philosophical and epistemological contours of this argument, see JODI A. BYRD, THE
TRANSIT OF EMPIRE: INDIGENOUS CRITIQUES OF COLONIALISM (2011).
163. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 154.
164. See United States Finally Endorses Historic United Nation’s Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, NARF LEGAL REV., Winter/Spring 2011, at 1, 1 (vol. 36, no.
1) [hereinafter United States Finally Endorses UN Declaration], available at http://www.
narf.org/pubs/nlr/nlr36-1.pdf.
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culture.165 NARF believes the Declaration has great potential to increase
tribal sovereignty in the United States.
Currently, Indian Country is just beginning to implement the
Declaration. There were not many tribal leaders involved in the negotiation
of the Declaration in the UN — mostly indigenous communities and
peoples from other countries participated. Tribes in the United States
started to take interest in the Declaration after the United States endorsed it
in 2010.166 Now, tribal leaders are reviewing the Declaration and
considering how it might support their communities. At the national level,
various Native American rights organizations are reviewing the Declaration
and hosting meetings to implement the Declaration in the United States.
In my remarks today, I challenge Indian Country to create a strategic
national implementation plan for the Declaration that would consist of three
points. The first would be to familiarize ourselves with the Declaration and
review federal Indian law for areas that fall short of the rights in the
Declaration. Second would be to hold the United States government
accountable to implement the Declaration and interact with tribal
governments in a manner consistent with the Declaration. The third and
final point would be to encourage tribal governments and leaders to use the
Declaration in day-to-day advocacy. The Declaration is a new helpful tool
for Native American advocates to rely upon in litigation, negotiation, and
legislation. With strategic planning, we can ensure the most beneficial use
of the Declaration in the United States.
The obligation of developing a national strategic implementation plan for
the Declaration rests with us, the lawyers, tribal leaders, and academics
working in Indian Country. We have a professional obligation to familiarize
ourselves with the rights in the Declaration. Based on our understanding,
we can begin to bolster our clients’ positions.
Critical to our inquiry into the Declaration and its implementation is
examining federal Indian law for inconsistencies with the rights recognized
in the Declaration. There are several areas of federal Indian law that fall
short of the rights in the Declaration. At NARF, we have already identified
areas of the law inconsistent with the Declaration. For example, Article 28
of the Declaration states that the taking of aboriginal land is compensable in

165. Id.
166. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the White House Tribal
Nations Conference (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2010/12/16/remarks-president-white-house-tribal-nations-conference.
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the form of new property or compensation.167 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States168 is in direct conflict with this Article, holding that the taking
of aboriginal land is not compensable.
Further, Articles 1 and 3 of the Declaration recognize the right of
indigenous peoples to “self-determination.”169 There is debate about the
scope of this right, but at minimum, it is the right to form a government and
make laws for your own people. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez170 suggests
that Congress has “plenary authority to limit, modify, or eliminate the
powers of local self-government” and the right of self-determination, which
is entirely inconsistent with Articles 1 and 3 of the Declaration.171 These are
just two examples. A thorough review would reveal many more
inconsistencies.
The second part of a national strategic plan to implement the Declaration
is holding the United States government accountable for meeting the
standards in the Declaration. The Obama Administration signed the
Declaration with several conditions.172 The most meaningful of the
conditions is the Administration’s claim that the Declaration is an
aspirational document, which is “not legally binding or a statement of . . .
international law.”173 The Declaration is a statement of morals and political
goals about how the United States should interact with indigenous
people.174 Indian Country had hoped the United States would categorically
support the Declaration and was disappointed by the conditional
endorsement. Nonetheless, President Obama stated in a speech announcing
the United States support of the Declaration, “The aspirations [the
declaration] affirms . . . are one[s] we must always seek to fulfill . . . But
what I want to be clear: What matters far more than words — what matters
far more than any resolution or declaration — are actions to match those
words.”175 As a community, we need to hold their feet to the fire to ensure
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 154, at 10-11.
348 U.S. 272, 290-91 (1955).
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 154, at 4.
436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 154, at 4.
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE THE
GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP & IMPROVE THE LIVES OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES (Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
153223.pdf.
173. Id. at 1.
174. Id.
175. Obama, supra note 166.
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their interactions with tribal governments meet the standards in the
Declaration.
One immediate concern regards tribal consultation. The Obama
Administration has adopted tribal consultation policies for federal
agencies.176 Generally, the consultation policies require the United States to
“consult” Native American tribes anytime tribal rights or interests could be
affected by a government action.177 Tribal leader consent is not required to
take action that could affect a tribal interest. Article 19 of the Declaration
requires nation states to work with indigenous peoples “to obtain their free,
prior and informed consent” before taking any action that may affect the
rights of indigenous people.178 The United States consultation policies
require consultation on actions that could affect tribal interests, but do not
require the seeking of consent and thus establish a lower standard of
government-to-government relations than in the Declaration. Because
consultation informs the United States’ interaction with Native American
tribes, this is another significant inconsistency between the Declaration and
federal policy.
The inconsistency between the Obama Administration’s consultation
policies and Article 19’s right to free, prior, and informed consent presents
an opportunity to hold the United States accountable for meeting the
standards in the Declaration by improving consultation policies in a manner
consistent with the Declaration.179
The third and final part of a national strategic implementation plan would
be using the Declaration in Native American communities. When we, as a
community of lawyers, professors, and tribal advisors understand the rights
in the Declaration, although we may not agree on their scope, we can begin
to use it in day-to-day advocacy.
NARF is currently working on this. For example, we have relied on the
Declaration to support damages claims against the United States. We have
referenced it in testimony before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs in
support of the right of free, prior, and informed consent.180 We have
176. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, MEMORANDUM ON TRIBAL CONSULTATION (Nov. 5,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-tribal-consul
tation-signed-president.
177. Id.
178. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 154, at 8.
179. See United States Finally Endorses UN Declaration, supra note 164, at 8.
180. Fulfilling the Federal Trust Responsibility: The Foundation of the Government-toGovernment Relationship: Oversight Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th
Cong. (2012) (statement of Melody McCoy, Staff Attorney, Native American Rights Fund).
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authored letters to the Obama Administration relying on the Declaration to
support tribal rights to intellectual property. We hope the Declaration will
be used in the re-negotiation of the Columbia River Treaty between Canada
and the United States. Article 36 of the Declaration confirms the right of
indigenous peoples to work together across international borders.181 This
enables the Salish people in the United States and Canada to meaningfully
participate in the renegotiation of this Treaty. Such participation could
result in increased protection of Salish interests.
It is up to Indian Country to implement the rights in the Declaration. We
give life to the Declaration by making the rights it recognizes our mantra in
day-to-day advocacy. I have learned from Yurok tribal leaders that
believing in having rights greater than those recognized today pays off. For
most of the twentieth century, the State of California did not recognize the
Yurok Tribe’s federally reserved fishing rights. This was devastating to our
people, who relied upon salmon from time immemorial for their livelihood
and subsistence.
In the 1970s, the opportunity arose to negotiate Yurok fishing rights with
the State of California and the United States. Yurok elders and tribal leaders
battled with state game wardens and officials about whether Yurok people
had fishing rights. The Yurok leaders never faltered in their position over
years of negotiations: they had federally reserved fishing rights, despite
losing most of their tribal land to allotment. The statement that we have
federally reserved fishing rights became a mantra, repeated in each
negotiation. Finally, the State of California heard us. Finally, the federal
government supported those rights. After years of repeating the same
mantra, the Yurok leaders secured our fishing rights. Those rights became a
reality.
This story teaches us to stay true to our position. We must believe in
having rights greater than those recognized today. The Declaration presents
an opportunity for us to believe that tribes in the United States can have
better rights than those currently recognized in federal law. It is up to us to
believe and advocate for those rights to make them a reality. By considering
these three steps, we can begin to outline our country’s strategic
implementation plan for the Declaration.
In closing, I want to share a story. When I was a student at Boalt Hall in
2007, I had a conversation with a fellow 3L student who realized I was
Native American. She asked me, and I quote, “Does your family live on a

181. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 154, at 13.
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tribe?” She didn’t misspeak; she used the word tribe as a geographic
location.
That question really got to me. This student was a 3L who had risen
through the education system in the United States and was about to
graduate from a very prestigious law school. She didn’t even know how to
use the word tribe in a proper way. This demonstrates that there is an
atrocious lack of knowledge in the United States about Native American
people and tribal governments. This country’s educators, Native American
people, and advocates have a moral obligation to teach the next generation
of leaders that indigenous peoples are here to stay, and that we have a
unique set of inherent rights recognized in the Declaration and federal law.
The Declaration is a strong statement that 150 nations across the world
acknowledge indigenous peoples.182 These Nations confirm indigenous
peoples’ human rights and the right to self-determination; rights to our land,
water, culture, religion, and education. One hundred fifty nations agreed on
these rights.
We as indigenous people and advocates have a moral obligation to teach
the next generation about these rights. Professor Frickey’s work was partly
about this; teaching Indian law to a broader community, a community of
privilege, and a community that is very powerful. I hope Boalt Hall will
continue his legacy. I hope the collective community of Native American
peoples and advocates will join NARF in developing a national
implementation plan for the Declaration that results in its most beneficial
use to improve the rights of Native American peoples and governments.
Thank you.
RACE, LAW, AND CULTURE
Matthew Fletcher, Professor of Law and Director of the Indigenous Law &
Policy Center, Michigan State University College of Law
Good to see you again. I was here yesterday too. My name is Matthew
Fletcher, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, and this
goes back to what was started yesterday, some of the things Phil Frickey
said when he was talking about new realism. I think this panel is designed
to highlight some of those things, particularly things like practical
scholarship, tribal duties, tribal law, intellectual honesty, and scholarly

182. United States Finally Endorses UN Declaration, supra note 164, at 1.
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objectivity.183 We have something like that on this panel. I think these
scholars strive for that.
Let me just briefly introduce the order of speakers, and then I’ll say just a
few words before Bethany gets up. But our first speaker is Bethany Berger.
She is really the best and most impressive legal history scholar we’ve had
in the field184 since Rob Williams.185 Following her is B.J. Jones. B.J. is a
tribal judge, and as someone mentioned earlier, I like to refer to B.J. as a
man who wrote the book on the Indian Child Welfare Act.186 It really does
not get any more grounded than that. He had the great quote, which I think
could be attributed to a lot of people, but I remember him saying it the best
and the loudest because of his voice, which is “Do tribal people really need
a federal solution to everything?” The next speaker will be Heather Kendall
Miller, who has done amazing work on tribal sovereignty in Alaska and
especially since the John v. Baker decision,187 which is probably one of the
more remarkable Indian law decisions in the modern era, if not ever. And
then we will conclude with Kristen Carpenter, who will be talking about her
powerful paper on limiting principles to American Indian religious
freedom.
We should talk more about scholarly objectivism and limiting principles,
which are some of those most powerful words that we in the community
often do not want to hear. But, as Phil Frickey often said, we don’t really
see the other side of that law. Phil said it in a way that was kind of scary
and leads us into traps. It’s amazing to me, and I’m glad it was Kristen who
really took the time to write her article about limiting principles that she’s
finishing up right now about sacred sites, litigation, and religious claims.188
It is so impressive, but it is sad that it took more than twenty years for this
article to come out after the Supreme Court asked us in 1986,189 1988,190

183. See generally Frickey, Transcending, supra note 1; Frickey, Address, supra note 3.
184. See generally Bethany R. Berger, "Power over This Unfortunate Race": Race,
Politics, and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957 (2004).
185. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
186. See B.J. JONES, MARK W. TILDEN & KELLY GAINES-STONER, THE INDIAN CHILD
WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE CUSTODY AND ADOPTION OF NATIVE
AMERICAN CHILDREN (2d ed. 2008).
187. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
188. See, Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in
American Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387 (2012).
189. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
190. See Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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and 1990:191 “Where are your limiting principles? We have been waiting for
a long time for these limiting principles.” Well Kristen has the answer.
Just for one more minute before we get going, this panel topic is about
race and culture Indian law, and once again there is a paper of mine over
here.192. My new goal is to get all of these re-prints and give them out at
conferences. Take one with you and enjoy it or recycle it. But the panel, in
some ways, is inspired by a couple of cases that really highlight this kind of
trap that Phil Frickey was talking about.
In 1974, the Court decided Morton v. Mancari,193 which we all know is
this big case where the way we interpreted it (I say this facetiously), but the
way we interpret it is if there is a law that benefits Indians, the law is valid.
Courts apply the political status classification. We don’t have to apply the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; we don’t have to apply strict scrutiny.
But if the law does not benefit Indians, well then that is racism. It is sort of
a “you win or the other side loses;” those are the only two options.
We get into this trap and then, in 1978, the Supreme Court decided Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.194 Both of these cases highlight something that
has become a big trap for Indian Country, and it derives from this notion of
tribal membership. The Mancari case says it is okay to do things for the
benefit or disadvantage of Indians, so long as it is based on politics. Tribal
membership is the core of that. The problem is, in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, where tribes can articulate forms of tribal membership, is that
they do so in a way that is downright “illiberal”, to quote Angela Riley,195
who really should be here as well. We have to recognize that there are
illiberalisms in Indian law and Indian Country, and what we need to do to
deal with that.
This illiberalism that Angela wrote about and continues to write about
has led us, in some ways, into a trap. Tribes do not have jurisdiction over
most non-members in their community; they do not have much jurisdiction
over anything unless it is on land that the tribe owns or is owned by a tribal
member. That’s not good enough. So what we have is an expression of
191. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
superseded by statute, Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA) § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2006), as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.
Ct. 1651 (2011).
192. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11
WYO. L. REV. 295 (2011).
193. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
194. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
195. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799
(2007).
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realism that Phil Frickey would have very much appreciated and this panel
is a great way to finish this conference.
Bethany Berger, Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law
So now, I’ve got the easy task of giving an overview of the role of race,
culture, and membership in Indian status in twelve to fifteen minutes! I am
going to try and use technology, which may not work so well, and if it
doesn’t work I’ll give it up.
I’m going to do four things: first, talk about common misunderstandings
about the role of race in Indian status; second, talk about the varied role that
race and descent actually do play in Indian status; third, consider and
quickly dismiss challenges that federal Indian law and the special status of
American Indians is racist because of the relationship between race and
Indian status; and fourth, consider and — not quite so quickly, but
ultimately — dismiss challenges to membership or citizenship criteria that
depend on descent as racist.
Here is the first of the technology efforts. This is a little movie and, I
warn you, this is propaganda created by the Cherokee Nation as part of their
dispute regarding the exclusion of people descended from those listed on
the Freedmen Rolls rather than the so-called Cherokee by Blood rolls.196
Nevertheless, it reveals a reality of Indian Country that challenges easy
equations between race and Indian status. In short, even after the
controversial amendments to the criteria for Cherokee citizenship, one only
needs to trace a lineal descendant to the rolls created between 1898 and
1914. Cherokee citizens can look black, white, Latino, or any combination
of races, as well as looking like what people think an Indian looks like.
Publications like the Washington Post said that the Cherokee Nation was
excluding its black people.197 If you know anything about the way the
citizenship criteria work, that wasn’t what happened, and the video
illustrates this.
Equating tribal descent requirements with racial
requirements is not that easy to do.

196. Cherokee Ancestors, MEET CHEROKEE NATION CITIZENS, http://www.meetthechero
kee.org/TakeAction/WatchOurVideo/tabid/1715/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
For a good discussion of the various rolls, and why Cherokee by Blood is a misnomer, see
Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribal Council, JAT-04-09, 2006 WL 5940403, at *6-8 (Cherokee
Jud. App. Trib. Mar. 7, 2006).
197. Ellen Knickmeyer, Cherokee Nation to Vote on Expelling Slaves’ Descendants,
WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
03/02/AR2007030201647.html.
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I will tell two more stories that reveal common misunderstandings about
the relationship between descent, race, and Indian status. First is the story
of Wanda Sykes, whose roots were traced back to free blacks in 1683 on
the show Finding Your Roots with Henry Louis Gates, Jr.198 In later
interviews about the show, Sykes quipped, “I’m so disappointed that he
didn’t get me any casino money out of this! Come on Skip, tell me I’m a
relative of Pocahontas. I would have retired.”199 Everybody here can
probably see some of the things that are wrong with this statement.
First Pocahontas’ Pamunkey tribe isn’t recognized by the federal
government, one of many requirements to engage in legal gambling on
Indian land. Sykes, in other words, is probably doing a whole lot better
than the current day Pamunkey. Second, even if the Pamunkey were
recognized, virtually all tribes require, at a minimum, that citizens trace
their descent to an individual on a roll created around 1900, some before
and some after.200 So simply being descended from Pocahontas wouldn’t
help Sykes a whole lot.
Of course, Sykes was joking. At the time Skip told her about her roots,
she actually got teary eyed thinking about the difficulty of remaining free
and black for all those generations of slavery. But these kinds of
misunderstandings aren’t confined to comedians. A more disturbing
example comes from Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson. In his
comments in the 1952 oral argument of Brown vs. Board of Education, he
said, “In some respects, in taxes at least, I wish I could claim to have a little
Indian blood.”201 First, as with Ms. Sykes, a little Indian blood wouldn’t do
much for him. Second, Indians pay virtually all federal taxes.202 Third, to
be eligible for any kind of immunity from any state taxes, Justice Jackson
would have to live near his reservation, not in Washington, D.C.203 So, even

198. Finding Your Roots (PBS television broadcast May 13, 2012), available at http://
www.pbs.org/wnet/finding-your-roots/video/john-legend-and-wanda-sykes/.
199. Felicia R. Lee, Family Tree’s Startling Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, at C1.
200. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 526-27 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (listing
tribal membership laws and noting that none accord membership based on descent from a
member as early as 1778).
201. BROWN V. BOARD: THE LANDMARK ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
29 (Leon Friedman ed., 2004) (1969).
202. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 680 (Nell J. Newton et al. eds.,
LexisNexis 2012) [hereinafter COHEN].
203. See id. at 697; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160-61 (1980); United States ex rel. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
v. South Dakota, 105 F.3d 1552, 1559-60 (8th Cir. 1997).
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those with tremendous power over what Indian status means do not
understand what it actually is.
This is perhaps understandable because what Indian status actually is
varies a lot. I’m not going to talk about all of the different definitions of
Indian status in detail, because we could be here all day. But even civil and
criminal jurisdiction use different definitions of Indian.
Criminal
jurisdiction requires Indian descent plus recognition of the individual as an
Indian by the federal government or an Indian tribe. This recognition does
not have to include enrollment or even eligibility for enrollment but can be
satisfied by some combination of residence on a reservation, receipt of
benefits reserved for Indians, participation in tribal affairs, and other
factors.204 Civil jurisdiction, in contrast, has no descent requirement but
requires membership in the tribe within whose territory you actually are. 205
And, as B.J. Jones knows much better than I do, the term Indian child under
the Indian Child Welfare Act follows a different definition, requiring either
membership or eligibility for membership plus being a biological child of a
member.206
Tribal membership, in turn, just about always requires some measure of
descent from tribal members or, occasionally, residence plus Indian
heritage.207 Take even the South Dakota case where the court said that a
204. Compare United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
woman who was one-eighth Chippewa but not enrolled in the tribe or recognized as Indian
by the federal government should have had her affirmative defense of Indian status
submitted to the jury to determine if she was Indian for purposes of criminal jurisdiction
based on being born on a reservation, living on a reservation, participating in Indian
religious ceremonies, being treated at Indian hospitals, and previous arrests by tribal
authorities), with United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding a 1/64
Blackfeet and 1/32 Cree man whose mother was a member of the Blackfeet Tribe, but who
was ineligible for enrollment and had not lived on the reservation, was not Indian even
though he was a “descendant member” eligible for tribal health care, education scholarships,
and hunting and fishing rights, and who had been arrested and prosecuted by tribal officials
several times).
205. COHEN, supra note 202, at 697; Tribes of Colville, 447 U.S. at 160-61; Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe, 105 F.3d at 1559-60.
206. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2006).
207. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA
INDIANS art. II, § 1 (1988) (requiring descent from a member plus one quarter Indian blood,
of which one-eighth must be Michigan Chippewa or Ottawa blood); CONST. OF THE GAY
HEAD TRIBE OF MASHPEE WAMPANOAG (AQUINNAH) art. II, § 2 (amended 1995) (requiring
trace descent from a person listed on the 1870 census roll); CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE
CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE art. II, § 1 (amended 1992) (stating members are those of
Indian blood on the 1934 census roll, those previously enrolled, and those born to Cheyenne
River Sioux members who were resident on the reservation at the time of birth, plus those of
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child of no known Native descent was an Indian child under the Indian
Child Welfare Act because he had been adopted by members of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and enrolled with the tribe.208 The enrollment
of the child, in fact, violated Cheyenne River Sioux written law, which says
you must be one-quarter Cheyenne River Sioux blood to become a tribal
citizen.209 While the case suggests that tribes in practice do not fully
implement their restrictive enrollment criteria, it also underlines how
prevalent descent requirements actually are.
Moving to federal government benefits, like health care and education:
they are all over the map. Some require membership in a recognized Indian
tribe; some require descent plus some looser measure of affiliation; a few
only require descent from any tribe, federally recognized or not.210 Some
tribes also provide governmental services or benefits not only to tribal
members, but also “descendant members,” which are descendants of
members with insufficient blood to enroll themselves. 211
There is no easy definition of self-identification as Indian. It may be
related to enrollment or descent but doesn’t depend on either of those.
African Americans whose ancestors served on Seminole Nation councils,
crossed the Trail of Tears with the Seminoles, and who themselves grew up
in Seminole country, identify as Seminole and Indian, regardless of blood
or recognition by the Seminole Nation.212 Any number of things can make
one the target of anti-Indian racism: perception as Indian, regardless of its
reality; 213 asserting tribal benefits or rights as an Indian;214 even claiming

Cheyenne River blood discretionarily admitted by a two-thirds vote of the tribal council);
CONST. AND BY-LAWS FOR THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN RESERVATION
OF MONTANA art. II, § 1 (amended 1978) (stating members are those on the 1935 census roll,
those of Indian blood born to members while in residence prior to adoption of this ordinance,
and those of one-fourth Blackfeet Indian blood born to blood Blackfeet members).
208. In re Dependency & Neglect of A.L., 442 N.W.2d 233, 235 (S.D. 1989).
209. See CONST. AND BY-LAWS OF THE CHEYENNE RIVER SIOUX TRIBE art. 2 (amended
1992).
210. See COHEN, supra note 202, at 1375; Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race,
Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1083 (2012).
211. See United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing descendant
membership in Blackfeet Tribe).
212. See William Glaberson, Who Is a Seminole, and Who Gets to Decide?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/29/us/who-is-a-seminole-and-who-gets-todecide.html?pagewanted-all&src=pm.
213. Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1278 (N.D. Ohio 1994)
(proving plaintiff was an Indian was not a necessary element of employment discrimination
claim based on Indian status).
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Indian status when one does not look or act sufficiently Indian in the mind
of the racist.215
Nevertheless, Indian status is inextricably connected to Indian descent,
even if the connections are varied and complex. Does that mean federal
Indian law itself is racist? Is it true that, as some Republicans claim, Indian
tribes cannot have jurisdiction over non-Indians who beat, rape, and abuse
Indian women on tribal land because tribes are “racially exclusive?”216 Of
course not. Jus sanguinus, or descent-based citizenship, is the dominant
rule outside of Great Britain and the United States.217 It is also a rule of
international law used for elections by populations in diaspora, such as the
independence referendum in South Sudan.218 In the tribal context, basing
citizenship significantly on descent may be the only feasible rule.
Jus soli, or citizenship based on birthplace or long residence, would be
vastly over and under-inclusive for tribes. In part, because of the long
process of colonization, many Indian people can’t live in their tribal
communities and access educational or employment opportunities that most
of us take for granted.219 According citizenship only to those born or
domiciled in tribal territories would exclude more than half of those with
significant connections to tribes. In addition, the same process of

214. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty AbuseWis., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1284, 1288-90 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (condemning those who asserted
treaty-fishing rights as “welfare warriors” and “timber niggers” at the same time as alleging
they weren’t sufficiently Indian).
215. Renee Ann Cramer, The Common Sense of Anti-Indian Racism: Reactions to
Mashantucket Pequot Success in Gaming and Acknowledgment, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
313, 330 (2006) (quoting townsperson’s complaint to a reporter that “more than half [of the
Mashantucket Pequots] are predominantly African American and the rest are mostly
white. . . . They just want special privileges. These are guys who used to be on welfare.”).
216. See David B. Muhlhausen & Christina Villegas, Violence Against Women Act:
Reauthorization Fundamentally Flawed, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.
heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/the-violence-against-women-act-reauthorization-fundamen
tally-flawed; Press Release, Senator Jon Kyl, VAWA’s Long March to Reauthorization (Apr. 30,
2012), available at http://votesmart.org/public-statement/688718/ #.UUI2CzdbU3s.
217. See Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608),
9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 73 (1997).
218. The Southern Sudan Referendum Act: Frequently Asked Questions, UNITED NATIONS
MISSION IN SUDAN (Oct. 26, 2010), http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Referen
dum/The%20Southern%20Sudan%20Referendum%20Act%20FAQ.pdf.
219. The average unemployment rate on reservations, for example, was 49% in 2005, and
as high as 89% on some reservations. See COHEN, supra note 202, at 1321. While more
tribes administer four-year colleges on their reservations, there are no research universities
or elite schools on reservations. Id. at 1404-05.
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colonization means that tribes today don’t have control over who comes
within, lives on, or is born within their borders.
The history of allotment, or the turn-of-the-century division and sale of
tribal lands to non-tribal members, has resulted in large non-Indian
populations owning property and having the right to live on reservations.220
The Supreme Court has interpreted allotment acts, as well as later cessions
of use rights to non-Indians and states, to strip tribes of the right to exclude
non-Indians from these lands.221 Giving citizenship to all those born or
long domiciled on reservations would result in many tribes being
overwhelmed by individuals with little connection and often outright
hostility toward those tribes.
Others have proposed a cultural test for tribal citizenship, to avoid
reliance on descent. As I tell my students, do you know who would be the
American Indians of the United States under such a test? Germans! In part
because of the craze for the Native American adventure novels of turn-ofthe-century German writer Karl May, a number of Germans actually study
and re-enact the languages and ceremonies of Indian cultures that many in
Native communities do not have a whole lot of time for.222 An
anthropologist friend of mine recalled being in a bar in Stuttgart and
hearing a group next to him of Germans having a fluent conversation in
Lakota. Despite efforts to reinvigorate tribal languages, not every patron
of a diner in Lakota country (most Sioux reservations are dry, so there are
no legal bars) could carry on such a conversation.
Is the demand for descent in tribal membership criteria itself caused by
racism? As Matthew Fletcher has written, it certainly creates a whole lot of
problems for tribes.223 And there clearly are racist elements in some of the
debates about tribal membership. Nevertheless, as you saw in the Our
Cherokee Ancestors video, the citizenship criteria adopted by the Cherokee
Nation do not exclude those who fit the common racial definitions of black,
white, Latino, or anybody else, so long as they can trace one ancestor to the
Cherokee by Blood rolls.
220. See id. at 73 (discussing effect of allotment in turning reservations into
checkerboards of white and Indian ownership).
221. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 (1997); Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1981).
222. Rivka Galchen, Wild West Germany: Why Do Cowboys and Indians So Captivate
the Country?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 9, 2012, at 40, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2012/04/09/ 120409fa_fact_galchen.
223. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 WYO. L.
REV. 295, 296 (2011).
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Despite this, the dispute over enrollment of the descendants of those on
the Cherokee Freedmen rolls cannot be separated from the racism of the
Cherokee Nation’s history of holding slaves, or from its present status as a
people in the United States, a place where anti-African-American racism is
often just below the surface. Equally often, as in the California cases,
descent is used as a justification to exclude individuals for reasons that are
largely political — ugly power plays regarding who should be in and who
should be out of power, and who should get its benefits.224
But in most cases, the demand for descent comes from a desire to have a
community that has cohesion with one’s ancestors. If things were
different — if reservations could be economically and socially self-sustaining
communities, with full control over who lived and died there — descent
should not be a prerequisite for membership. But we don’t live in that world.
In this world, descent is an important, perhaps necessary, tool for preserving
community and furthering self-determination.
Thank you very much.
B.J. Jones, Director, Tribal Judicial Institute, University of North Dakota
School of Law
I appreciate the fact that everyone is here to carry on the spirit of Phil
Frickey. I actually knew Phil when he taught at the University of Minnesota
Law School because I happen to be a tribal judge for the Prairie Island
Indian community in Minnesota. I want to tell you the first time I met Phil,
Phil and I were invited by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
to do a presentation at their annual conference when they were in the Twin
Cities. The presentation was not to the district court judges or appellate
judges; it was to the magistrates.
Magistrates are an interesting group because in many ways they feel like
they should be treated like U.S. district court judges, and sometimes they
carry a chip on their shoulder for that. I recall an interesting thing — that at
the same time we were scheduled to present to the magistrates, the federal
district court judges and appellate justices were hearing from the U.S.
Supreme Court justice who was assigned to the Eighth Circuit at the time,
Clarence Thomas. I think the magistrates were most interested in listening
to Professor Frickey’s presentation because of his reputation for reticence.
224. See Carmen George, Dissension After Chukchansi Council Meeting, SIERRA STAR
(Oakhurst, Cal.), Dec. 29, 2011, http://www.sierrastar.com/2011/12/28/57081/dissensionafter-chukchansi-council.html; James Dao, In California, Indian Tribes with Casino Money
Cast Off Members, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/us/
california-indian-tribes-eject-thousands-of-members.html?pagewanted-all&_r=0.
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We didn’t know what he would talk about, being a non-garrulous fellow.
As a result, we had an audience that was not that enthused about being
there. Plus, you combine his reticence with our exciting topic — the tribal
court exhaustion rule — and we did not have the most engaged audience.225
But Phil Frickey started talking to the magistrates and after Professor
Frickey described “the tribal court exhaustion rule as a prudential doctrine,”
one of the magistrates was apparently put off because he said to Professor
Frickey, “please don’t be condescending to us and treat us like one of your
law students,” even though “prudential” is how the U.S. Supreme Court
described the tribal court exhaustion rule.226 Nonetheless, this magistrate
excoriated Phil Frickey for about three minutes about how the academic
world is so removed from the realities of what Indian people face in tribal
communities.
So in order to accommodate the magistrates, Frickey then proceeded to
use two and three syllable words throughout this presentation. Whenever he
would use a word that was in any way legalese, he would turn to the
magistrate and say, “that means this in real life.” I always found that
commendable about Frickey, that he could dumb down Indian law even to
the point that federal magistrates could understand it.
I currently spend most of my time as a tribal judge for several tribal
communities in South Dakota and Minnesota. The bio in the program
materials is very outdated and must be from the University of North Dakota
(“UND”) Law School website. I worked at the UND Law School, which is
the university that took fifty years to get rid of the Fighting Sioux
nickname. So it takes us a while to update things. I am mostly a tribal judge
now. I work for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse
Reservation in South Dakota, but I kind of traverse the Dakota/Minnesota
border with a gavel in hand. I’m also a judge for Prairie Island, which is a
small Dakota Sioux Tribe outside of the Twin Cities with one of the more
profitable gaming enterprises in the nation, and for Pine Ridge, which is
one of the poorer tribes in the nation. So I think I get a sense of some of the

225. The United States Supreme Court determined that before a non-Indian party can
challenge a tribal court’s jurisdiction over him in federal court, that party must first exhaust
his tribal court remedies to permit the tribal court to determine its jurisdiction first. See Nat’l
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851-53 (1985). Later the
Court extended the same requirement to the exercise of federal court diversity jurisdiction
over a dispute arising in Indian Country. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16
(1987).
226. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 20 n.14.
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issues that go on in Indian communities on a daily basis. But I also teach, so
I have some footing in the academic world.
I want to talk about race, culture, and law and examine how tribal courts
have lost jurisdiction, especially jurisdiction over non-Indians.227 How did
Indian tribes lose jurisdiction over the years, initially over non-Indians, and
later over non-member Indians? As part of the Violence Against Women
Act reauthorization (“VAWA 2013”), we now have an attempt to restore
some semblance of jurisdiction over non-Indians in the arena of domestic
violence.228 I heard Professor Deer talk about how critical it is that Indian
tribes regain jurisdiction,229 and I concur with her opinion. There is a lot of
vigilant opposition to this tribal jurisdiction from groups that surprised me,
like the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys. Groups like
this are vigorously opposed to any notion that Indian tribes should have
jurisdiction over non-Indians.230

227. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978), the United
States Supreme Court held that Indian tribes lack the inherent authority to prosecute nonIndians who commit crimes within their territory because such jurisdiction was implicitly
divested by their status as dependent nations and was not necessary to the exercise of their
dependent status.
228. After Oliphant, the Supreme Court ruled that Indian tribes similarly lacked inherent
jurisdiction to punish Indians from other tribes other than the tribe controlling the territory
where the crime occurred in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). This decision led to a
complete void in criminal jurisdiction over certain offenders because of the General Crimes
Act prohibition on federal jurisdiction over Indian on Indian crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(2012) (resulting in congressional action to overturn the Duro case by amending the Indian
Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006), to make tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember Indians commensurate with federal jurisdiction over Indians). This legislative fix is
often times referred to as the “Duro fix” and was explicitly upheld in United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193 (2004). The Duro fix was considered a legitimate exercise of congressional
authority to define tribal court inherent authority. The current attempt in the reauthorization
of the Violence Against Women Act to expand tribal court criminal jurisdiction over nonIndian domestic violence offenders is similar to the Duro fix in that it would permit tribal
court criminal jurisdiction in limited instances, provided certain rights are extended to nonIndian offenders (right to free counsel, right to have non-Indians on juries). This would thus
appear to be consistent with Lara’s discussion on congressional authority over tribal affairs.
229. See Levi Rickert, Muscogee Sarah Deer Talks Tribal Provision of VAWA on
MSNBC’s Up with Chris Hayes Show, NATIVE NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 17, 2012, 6:30 AM),
http://www.nativenewsnetwork.com/muscogee-sarah-deer-talks-tribal-provision-of-vawaon-msnbcs-up-with-chris-hayes-show.html.
230. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Opposition Letter to Title IX of VAWA Reauthorization
from Federal Defenders (and Commentary), TURTLE TALK (Apr. 25, 2012, 8:49 AM),
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2012/04/25/opposition-letter-to-title-ix-of-vawa-reauthoriza
tion-from-federal-defenders-and-commentary/.
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In 1990, I was a legal services/public defender on the Standing Rock
Reservation. I recall when the Supreme Court decided Duro v. Reina. The
U.S. Supreme Court said not only do tribal courts lack inherent jurisdiction
over non-Indians, they lack jurisdiction over non-member Indians.231 One
year later, Congress reacted to Duro by restoring tribal court criminal
jurisdiction over non-member Indians.232 When you read Duro, it is
apparent that the Court relied on the same legal reasoning as the Court in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe by declaring tribes lacked jurisdiction
over non-member Indians. The notion was that such jurisdiction was not
necessary to tribal self-preservation and government and was thus
implicitly divested.233
When I was a public defender in 1991, a group of us were concerned
with tribes getting jurisdiction restored over non-members because the
Supreme Court equated non-member Indians to non-Indians. Although we
understood the huge vacuum in public safety this decision created, we also
understood the fundamental notion that Native people should not have
fewer rights than non-Indian persons.234 So we reached out to different
entities to rally some support to oppose this bill. We got absolutely nothing.
No one was willing to step up and say this was a violation of civil rights —
that it is not appropriate for a tribe to assert jurisdiction over Indians from
other reservations.
At the time, 10% of our clientele were Indians from other reservations. It
piqued my interest: why would these entities comprised of civil libertarians
dedicated to the rights of human beings be opposed to tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, but be completely apathetic when tribes were permitted
to re-assert jurisdiction over non-member Indians? Could it be that nonmember Indians are not as worthy of protection vis-à-vis Indian tribes as
non-Indians? Or perhaps there is the sense that non-member Indians,
because they are Native, have a notion of tribal justice that non-Indians
cannot conjure. It just struck me as odd, and as a result, I tried to go back

231. Duro, 495 U.S. at 696-98.
232. Congress amended the section of the Indian Civil Rights Act defining “Indian,” 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), to reference the use of the term in federal criminal law
jurisprudence, which includes all Indian persons, not just those who are members of the tribe
where the offense occurred.
233. Duro, 495 U.S. at 684-88.
234. If the basis for the Oliphant decision was that it was fundamentally unfair for Indian
tribes to assert authority over United States citizens who were not permitted to participate in
that tribe’s government, the same logic would seem to prevail in cases involving Indians
from other reservations.
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and look at U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area to determine if
Indian tribes lost this jurisdiction because of race, culture, or law.
Did Indian tribes lose their jurisdiction because of some legal reasoning?
Was it due to some distinction based on race? Or was it purely cultural
discrimination? I went back to Ex parte Crow Dog,235 a case you may find
irrelevant to this discussion. However, it was in Crow Dog that the Supreme
Court said the territorial court of Dakota had no jurisdiction to hang Crow
Dog for killing Sinte Gleska on what is now the Rosebud Reservation.
One of the things the Court looked at in making its decision was the
notion of fundamental fairness in the application of federal law to Crow
Dog236 because at the time there was no federal law that specifically applied
to intra-tribal crime on Indian reservations. The General Crimes Act at that
time did not seem to permit prosecution of Indian-on-Indian crime because
of the prohibition of federal jurisdiction over intra-tribal crimes.237 One of
the things the Court looked at in Crow Dog that it later utilized in Oliphant
was whether Crow Dog should be judged by the standards of another
culture in a criminal prosecution — the standards of a superior people
according to the Court. The Court said that Crow Dog was from a tribe that
could not understand the western justice system, the legal system of a
superior people.238
Later on in the case of Oliphant, the Supreme Court said tribes were
implicitly divested of jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Court actually
hearkened back to the language from Crow Dog and said that non-Indians
should not be subjected to the standards of an inferior people in the arena of
criminal jurisdiction.239 Oliphant cites Crow Dog for that proposition, even
though Crow Dog had held that an inferior people — Natives, according to
the Supreme Court — should not be subject to the laws of the superior
American culture. This is not a race-based distinction. Instead, it is clearly a
culturally drawn distinction — one nation’s culture is so inferior that the
235. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
236. Id. at 563.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
238. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 569 ("[A]s a dependent community who were in a state of
pupilage, advancing from the condition of a savage tribe to that of a people who, through the
discipline of labor, and by education, it was hoped might become a self-supporting and selfgoverned society.").
239. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211 (1978) (“These
considerations, applied here to the non-Indian rather than Indian offender, speak equally
strongly against the validity of respondents' contention that Indian tribes, although fully
subordinated to the sovereignty of the United States, retain the power to try non-Indians
according to their own customs and procedure.”).
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nation should not be able to judge the superior nation’s citizens in the
criminal justice system.240
In Duro, the Supreme Court essentially ruled that Oliphant was
applicable to non-member Indians because non-member Indians supposedly
could not understand the unique Indian cultures and ways of another
tribe.241 That leads me back to the discussion being held now regarding
restoration of tribal court criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians under
VAWA 2013. It is a very modest proposal, essentially that tribes should be
able to assert jurisdiction over certain non-Indians that commit domestic
violence in tribal communities.242 It gives tribes jurisdiction over nonIndians who commit domestic violence against tribal members when they
live in the community and have a relationship with the tribal member or
work for the tribe. That jurisdiction applies only in certain contexts, and
only when certain procedural protections are afforded these non-Indians.243
In affording these procedural protections we basically countenance an
assault upon tribal, cultural, and traditional practices in order to regain
some jurisdiction.
For example, tribes would have to allow non-Indians to sit on tribal
juries. Tribes would also have to grant court-appointed legal counsel to any
non-Indian prosecuted under this special provision of jurisdiction, and there
would be some form of expedited federal court review in excess of what is
currently permitted under federal habeas corpus review under the Indian
Civil Rights Act.244 I would not want to be the tribal judge that had to
explain to a tribal member charged with the same crime as a non-Indian,
who perhaps committed a domestic assault on his cousin, why the non-

240. Id.
241. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990).
242. See S. 1925, 112th Cong. § 904(B)(i)-(iii) (2012) (permitting tribal court jurisdiction
over non-Indian offenders who have “sufficient ties to the Indian tribe,” meaning he/she
must either reside in the Indian Country of the prosecuting tribe, be employed in the Indian
Country of the prosecuting tribe, or be the spouse or intimate partner of a member of the
prosecuting tribe).
243. The proposal would require that non-Indian defendants be entitled to the full
panoply of constitutional protections, including due process rights and an indigent
defendant’s right to appointed counsel (at the expense of the tribe) in order to meet federal
constitutional standards. This includes the right to petition a federal court for habeas corpus
to challenge any conviction, to stay detention prior to review, and the explicit protection of
“all other rights whose protection is necessary under the Constitution of the United States.”
Id. § 904.
244. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006).
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Indian gets free legal counsel and the tribe doesn’t provide him with legal
counsel. Would you want to be in that position? I do not think so.
I think that although I am in complete support of VAWA 2013 and its
Native provisions, it strikes me as odd that there is so much opposition to it.
Now I’m beginning to think, after looking at this legacy of cases starting
with Crow Dog, that maybe we are giving up too much in VAWA 2013.
Obviously the federal government thinks the only way tribes should assert
jurisdiction over non-Indians is if tribes completely divest themselves of
any traditional law and practice in its transactions with non-Indians. I am
not sure tribes want to do that. If you look at some of the tribes that have
gone toward a western system, where the traditions are still quite strong,
they have some of the highest crime rates in the country.245 Why is that?
Because the western system of justice does not respond to the core reason
why criminal activity occurs in the Indian communities — the breakdown
of relationships in tribal communities due to the imposition of non-tribal
standards and customs.
So we have to step back and recognize that assaults on tribal justice
systems are not race based, but are actually culturally based. At their core is
the belief that Indian tribes cannot possibly administer justice in cases
involving non-Indians because justice systems that incorporate culture and
traditions have been legally decreed inferior and cannot possibly pass
judgment on people from a superior culture. I am not sure we want to
accept that premise as the quid pro quo for the restoration of jurisdiction.

245. See Timothy Williams, Brutal Crimes Grip an Indian Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/us/wind-river-indian-reservation-where-brutal
ity-is-banal.html?_r=0. This article discusses the Wind River Indian Reservation in
Wyoming, where the United States increased law enforcement and prosecution funding in
order to combat crime over a two-year period. This resulted in a 7% increase in violence on
the reservation, something tribal members opined was the result of failing to respect tribal
traditional peacemaking practices.
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